Bailouts. All the rage.

The debate over the bailout rages on.

On the one hand, the companies involved have only themselves to blame. No one denies that they brought this on themselves. The nation watches incredulous as the wealthy CEOs fly into the nation’s capital on their private jets and claim that it was not their fault––and begrudge anyone who suggests that their compensation should limited if they receive federal aid.

It is hard not to want to let them face the rigors of bankruptcy. Let others in their industry who did not make bad decisions reap the rewards of their strategic wisdom and take market share from those made bad choices. That is the way it is. That is the way it’s supposed to be.

Those arguing for the bailout question whether the economy can sustain the wreckage and havoc that will ensue if the companies are allowed to fail. They argue that rather than risk the widespread repercussions of a collapse, we should invest in the companies, shore up their financial condition, and hope they make better decisions going forward.

So we held a national debate and in the end, after the cajoling of Wise Men from across the Capitol, Congress and the President approved the $700 billion bailout for the finance industry.

We had a referendum on pain and our willingness to walk the walk of our capitalist principles, and we decided we just weren’t up to it.

Now come the automakers. It is like deja vu all over again. Once again, the companies have brought this on themselves. Once again, the wealthy CEOs fly in on their private jets, and show nothing approaching accountability for their circumstances.

And once again the fundamental question is whether the companies and their stakeholders will suffer for their own bad judgments, and whether their competitors who have demonstrated strategic wisdom will be allowed to take market share from those who made bad choices. The way it is supposed to be.

Those arguing for the Detroit bailout question whether the economy can sustain the wreckage and havoc that will ensue if the companies are allowed to fail. But this time, the resistance is fierce.

The hypocrisy of the moment is profound. This is not an argument for or against aid to Detroit, but against the hubris that now surrounds the debate. Would a debtor-in-possession bankruptcy process be a better choice over the long term to secure a better future for GM and Ford? Perhaps. Are other American automakers that are highly successful in the marketplace—Toyota, Honda, Nissan, BMW et al—disadvantaged by a government bailout? Sure.

And each of these arguments could have been made in the financial bailout. Like the automakers, the best efforts of Hank Paulson may just be delaying the day when Citibank succumbs, and newer, foreign-owned banks with a growing presence—Toronto Dominion, Banco Santander, FirstBank—emerge from the middle market to replace those at the top who fall under the weight of their bureaucratic indifference to the customer and their derivative-laden balance sheets.

As Joseph Schumpeter famously wrote, the process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is the driving force of innovation and growth. But as we are now witnessing, there is destruction and collateral damage along the way. Sometimes the damage is small and incidental, and sometimes the damage is cataclysmic.

We already chose not to face head-on the consequences of failure on Wall Street. Now, as the economy is coming undone, one has to question whether this is the moment to let GM and others fall under the weight of their legacy cost structures. The arguments for bankruptcy and the urgency of finally having Detroit make the real changes that are essential to its future are valid. But bailout opponents should not kid themselves into thinking that the process will be smooth or without collateral damage.

All of the obligations that GM will walk away from in bankruptcy—retiree healthcare, support for redundant dealerships, bond and lease payments for redundant facilities—are payments that someone else receives. Our essential challenge as we address the economic recession is to sustain economic activity and demand in the marketplace as consumers and companies reduce their spending. A GM bankruptcy will exacerbate this challenge and increase the costs to government at all levels to sustain economic activity and mitigate the collateral damage.

In many ways, our response to the auto industry is shaped by our response to the financial collapse. We rose to the urgency of that challenge, and now watch incredulous at the apparently arbitrary allocation of those billions of dollars of our money. Why has $150 billion been allocated to secure the interest of counterparties to AIG derivatives rather than simply to secure the policyholders? Why have we given tens of billions to the largest commercial banks only to see them cut back lending and increase banking fees? Why are we giving money to American Express––the lender to the richest Americans––while little is done for homeowners? Why have we rewarded failure and not instead mitigated collateral damage and allowed those who have been successful in the marketplace to win?

We have watched one bailout unfold, and we have not been impressed. We heeded the Wise Men, and now we feel violated.

But how do we now hold failing auto companies to a higher standard? And why now, when money is being tossed around the Street like confetti? Is it because this time the beneficiaries would be autoworkers and retirees rather than well-heeled moneymen, who to this day have yet to apologize to the nation for the destruction they have wrought?