Thursday, February 26, 2009

Learn from Google. Make the federal budget free.

Why tax people?

Really. We now know that no one likes paying taxes. The presumption was that Democrats liked taxes and that Republicans were opposed to them. But clearly that hypothesis was proven wrong. First, when the man who now sits atop the IRS, Tim Geithner, was nominated to be Treasury Secretary, it turned out that he preferred to not pay taxes.

But that failed to prove the point, as for many it was unclear whether Geithner was actually a Democrat. But Tom Daschle turned the trick. It finally was clear that Democrats, like Republicans, do not like to pay taxes.

Back in the day, taxes were not the issue. Spending was the issue. Back then, when everyone presumed that balancing budgets were among the sole tasks that our members of Congress were charged to perform––that and trashing the UN––Republicans liked to spend less and tax less. Democrats liked to spend more… and were somewhat agnostic on taxes. It was not that they liked taxes per se, but they were a necessary step to get to spend more.

Then Ronald Reagan changed everything, and all assumptions were cast to the wind. Since the Reagan Presidency, Republicans learned that spending really was not so bad, as long as taxes didn't have to pay for it. At first they voiced horror at the fiscal consequences of tax cuts, but, in time, they got over it.

And in time it really annoyed the hell out of Democrats. Ronald Reagan had led the Republican Party to the Promised Land. Cut taxes, spend money and let the chips fall where they may.

The premise was simple. It was unarguable. At any level of taxation, there is a lower level that will put more money back in the hands of taxpayers, and that will provide more resources for businesses to hire people and spur the economy onward.

It has become axiomatic. At every level of taxation, there is a lower level that if achieved will spur on the economy.

Therefore, following the logic to its natural conclusion, the optimal tax rate is zero.

Unless you need money. For stuff. Guns. Butter. You know. Stuff.

Or so we thought.

Today, we are approaching political Nirvana. In the final great leap of bipartisanship, the new administration is reaching for a new middle ground. Cut taxes in a nod to Republicans (and, it turns out, to everyone else, who also prefer to not pay taxes.) And increase spending. Because… Well. Because we can. Because we must.

And forget all those arguments about the expiring 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts. That is not a tax increase. That is just reality once again coming back to bite us.

Pardon the digression, but those tax cuts marked the beginning of the end of any integrity in tax policy. The scoring rules at the time required that tax legislation be budget neutral over a ten-year horizon. Congress was unable to pay for the tax cuts with other increases or spending cuts, so they paid for them by having them expire in year eight or so. So they complied with the ten-year scoring rules. Kind of. Lots of cuts for eight years. Lots of revenue to pay for them in years nine and ten.

Back in 2001, as they contemplated years of tax cuts that would suddenly expire, people jokingly referred to 2010 as “the year we push momma from the train,” because in 2011 the estate tax would rise dramatically back to its 2001 level. Well, here we are in year eight, and there is no need to worry about the estate tax. The estates were invested with Bernie Madoff.

Everyone gives lip service to debt being the problem that got us into our current mess. Not passing on to our children “a debt they cannot pay” was the great bi-partisan applause line of the President's speech the other night. They applaud fiscal responsibility. They just don’t believe in it. Or know what it is.


Look at the record over the past two decades. Our economic performance has been flat, other than the growth that we have literally purchased with debt. As a nation, we are like households whose real income has been flat for a decade, but who fund an increasing standard of living—new electronics, cruises, home improvements—through more and more borrowing. For years now, as a nation, our GDP growth has increasingly been purchased with imported capital.

Really.

Take a look at the new federal budget. $3.55 trillion of spending. A $1.75 trillion deficit. Maybe we have reached the tipping point. Finally, our revenues may become less than half our budget, and we can begin to migrate our tax rates to their optimal level.

Zero.

That does not mean we will have a 100% deficit. Far from it. We will still have cattle grazing fees.

And we will have the loan guarantee fees that the Federal Reserve charges for guaranteeing private debt. Those should be growing.

Oh. Sorry. Those aren’t in the budget.

My bad.

The return of the business cycle

Twenty years or so ago, when my I was planning a move to California for a new job position, I listened to an interview regarding a study of the psychological affects of recessions on individuals and communities. Specifically, the study compared the incidence of mental illness, depression and suicide in Los Angeles during the recession there in the early 1980s with New Hampshire during the 1970s.

Apparently, mental illness, depression and suicide were more prevalent in southern California at the time than had been the case in New Hampshire during the previous decade. The study attributed much of the different experiences of the affected communities to differences in family and community structure. In New Hampshire, people continued to live in extended families and extended communities. During the economic downturn, older members of the community would tell stories about earlier recessions, and pass on the wisdom of the elders:

Economic cycles are part of life, like the seasons. Families need to cut back and save as the downturn approaches. During the downturn, workers need to be patient and improve their job skills. And, like the seasons, this is normal, and like a hard winter, this too will pass.

Los Angeles was a very different place, where people had moved to the new world of optimism and opportunity. But in the face of an economic downturn, the perspective of life and the economic seasons was lost. Instead, lacking the wisdom of the grandparents and elders in the community, the fear and pessimism that comes with job losses and economic decline was exacerbated and reinforced.

Over the past months, our country has responded to the recession with fear and pessimism that has been largely unchecked by an historical perspective on economic cycles. We have responded as Los Angeles responded, and the politicians and the pundits are exacerbating the fears expressed in conversations around kitchen tables, in beauty salons and at Starbucks.

Looking back, it is apparent that the depth and severity of our current economic downturn is due in large measure to the success of the Federal Reserve in forestalling significant periods of economic downturn for much of the past twenty-five years. We forgot—as individuals, as families and as businesses—that the economy is cyclical.

But even worse, we lost the value of periodic recessions as a cleansing and humbling time. For individuals and families, recessions are a time to take stock, to cut back on our materialist tendencies, to save, to pay down debts, to retool our skills. For businesses, recessions are a time to rethink strategy, to close marginal operations, and improve attention to costs and excess. For bankers, it is time to learn to write off bad debts and tighten up lending standards, and perhaps teach young associates the basic principle that when there are no profits, there are no bonuses.

In 1997, Foreign Affairs magazine published “The End of the Business Cycle,” trumpeting the success of the west in conquering the business cycle.

“Business cycles -- expansions and contractions across most sectors of an economy -- have come to be taken as a fact of life. But modern economies operate differently than nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century industrial economies. Changes in technology, ideology, employment, and finance, along with the globalization of production and consumption, have reduced the volatility of economic activity in the industrialized world. For both empirical and theoretical reasons, in advanced industrial economies the waves of the business cycle may be becoming more like ripples.”

Lost in the triumphalism of the article was recognition of the important role that periodic economic downturns play in stemming the exuberance, the hubris and the bad habits that build up during the expansionary phase of the economic cycle. For the past twenty-five years, the Federal Reserve has managed to forestall the regular economic downturns that previously characterized the post-war years. The dramatic increases in labor productivity that came about through computerization and changes in information technology, and the suppression of wage inflation that resulted from globalization and outsourcing, combined to suppress inflationary pressures.

As a result, the economy ploughed forward through crisis after crisis, through failure and fraud. The collapse of Continental Illinois. The savings and loan crisis. The bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham. The Asian financial crisis. The Russian financial crisis. The Internet bubble. The collapse of Long-Term Capital Management. September 11th. Enron. WorldCom. At each point of crisis or threat to the financial markets and investor confidence, the Fed was able to forestall downturns and spur continued economic growth by flooding liquidity into the system or pushing down interest rates, with little concern to the normal inflationary consequence.

Ten years later, in 2007, Business Week Chief Economist Michael Mandel articulated the new economic paradigm on his Economics Unbound blog.

“We now may be in a world of mini-recessions—sharp falls in one or two sectors which do not pull down the whole economy… A sharp drop in one sector—say, housing—may pull down a couple of adjacent sectors, such as furniture. But the rest of the economy steams on, and maybe even accelerates, as resources are transferred from the weak sectors to the strong sectors.

“This picture of the world actually fits very well with neoclassical economics. We may get a couple of quarters of negative GDP growth, but deep economy-wide recessions may be an anomaly rather than the norm.”

Now, we have learned that there is no new paradigm, and the business cycle is still with us. But this time, without periodic downturns to temper our exuberance and stem our excesses, we are paying a heavy price.

Consider this. Since Paul Volker stepped down as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve twenty years ago, median family income has increased ten percent in real terms. During that same period, household mortgage debt increased almost six-fold and consumer credit more than tripled, and financial institution debt grew more than eight-fold. Together, household and financial institution debt increased by over $24 trillion.

Even now, over a year into this financial crisis, we have yet to fully accept the depth of pain and dislocation that deleveraging may require. As we face the consequences of the boom years, we are going to need old wisdom as much as we need new policies. We are going to need to remain calm in the face of 24-hour cable shows playing on our fears and trumpeting every moment of our economic travails. Last night, President Obama tried to move beyond the position of policy wonk-in-chief, toward the role of the grandfather in New Hampshire. He scolded us for our excesses, while reminding us that the economy is cyclical and will rebound in time.

But what will we have learned when this moment is past? Will students of the Dismal Science no longer see the “end of the business cycle” as the Holy Grail of economic polity? Will we accept that the cycles of economic life are a necessary—and ultimately productive—check on human tendencies toward excess and exuberance? Or will we quickly fall prey to the hubris of policymakers and pundits who will as we ride the next wave, assure us that this time, once again, things will be different.

Saturday, February 21, 2009

Take a deep breath, and let go.

This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation took over Silver Falls Bank in Silverton, Oregon. Silver Falls Bank was the 14th bank taken over by the FDIC this year. This compares with 25 banks that failed in 2008 and 3 in 2007. Bank failure is not unheard of. And up until a week or so ago, the term “nationalization” was not invoked.

Since its creation in 1933, the role of the FDIC has been to prevent runs on banks by insuring bank deposits and to oversee the orderly disposition of failed banks. For the better part of a century, it has done its job quietly and effectively. And today, we would all be well served to let the FDIC and its capable leader, Sheila Bair, do their job.

From the beginning of the current financial crisis, one of the problems has been the failure of the leading agents of the government, embodied by Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke, to establish clear rules and follow them. Instead, we have plodded along, from crisis point to crisis point. From Bear Stearns to Fannie Mae to Merrill Lynch to Lehman Brothers to AIG to Washington Mutual, each collapse engendered a unique response by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.

In a similar manner, the focus of the $700 billion Toxic Asset Relief Program—the federal bailout—to address the insolvency of the nation’s largest banks has veered from the purchase of toxic assets to injections of capital to guaranteeing of assets. Now once again, toxic asset purchases are back in vogue as the strategy of choice, this time under the “good bank, bad bank rubric.”

This week, the stock market broke through its technical support levels, and now appears headed toward 6,000 as its next support level. Some observers have suggested that the decline reflected the market response to looming plans for the “nationalization” of the banking system and one more step down the road to socialism, as trumpeted on the cover of Newsweek.

But market decline was not a result of the fear of nationalization, and nationalization would not mark the next milestone on the road to socialism. Quite the contrary. Investors are running away from banks—good banks and bad banks alike—precisely because the federal efforts to date have obscured the true financial condition of the banks. Faced with uncertainty and poor information, investors will always pull back and wait for the fog to clear.

The takeover of insolvent banks by the FDIC is the way the process is supposed to work, and the way it has always been allowed to work—up until now. For all of the debates over the “Swedish Model”—where banks were taken over, balance sheets reconfigured, and then spun back out to private ownership—the way they did it in Sweden is not actually all that different from the way they do it at the FDIC, when the FDIC is allowed to do its job. Insolvent banks are seized. Assets are sold off and the depositors are paid or, if possible, the balance sheet is cleaned up and the bank is sold off to a new owner.

The problem today is that a small number of our insolvent banks, notably Citi, are very big and very visible. But the problems they face are the problems that the FDIC was created to fix. This is not nationalization, it is essentially a debtor-in-possession bankruptcy process whereby the FDIC serves as the receiver.

If left to do its job, the FDIC would do what the banks resolutely refuse to do: sell their bad assets, accept the price of their business decisions, and move on. The banks refuse to do it because it would force them to face up to what the markets, and increasingly outraged taxpayers, have known for a while: They are insolvent.

For years, America has told other countries how to deal with financial crises: Cut your losses. Clean up your balance sheets. Get on with it.

This week, the stock market said the same thing.

On a side note, the Ford Motor Company—the one that is not taking federal money—has seen its market share rise steadily for the past four months. This is the way markets are supposed to work. Saving one company or another—or one bank or another—is not an inherent public good, however politically compelling. And pumping public money into one company serves to dramatically disadvantage their competitors.

One of the biggest mistakes that Hank Paulson made was demanding that banks take TARP money, even if they didn’t want to—or need to—in order to remove the stigma from those who did. Somehow, this was supposed to be a way of maintaining confidence in the system. But instead of protecting the bad banks, by letting them hide among the good, it has achieved the opposite. That is why investors have turned their back and are walking away.

The banking industry and the markets would be better served if the politicians and the pundits quieted their politically loaded hubris about nationalization, and if the Treasury and the Fed let the process work, as it has been designed to work. Forget about creating good banks and bad banks. Let insolvent banks take their medicine. Management, shareholders and bondholders will pay a steep price for business failure. And let the banks that are healthy take market share from those that are not.

It is time to let the process work. Punish failure. Reward success. This is not nationalization, it is the way the system is designed to work. Time to take the banks off the dole, and let Sheila Bair do her job.

Saturday, February 07, 2009

Money talks. Or at least it ought to.

It needs to be said: The Congress of the United States has no business setting the terms of executive compensation. That is not how capitalism is supposed to work.

But then again, the US Government has no business giving tens of billions of dollars to corporations, and getting nothing in return but a hope and a prayer. That is not how capitalism is supposed to work, either.

Take Citi. This Thursday, the market value of Citigroup––the icon of the American banking establishment––was $18.3 billion. That is to say, at least according to the old school rules, that for $18.3 billion, you could purchase all of the common stock of the company. For something less than that, you could purchase enough shares to control the Board of Directors.

Yet, over the past few months, the US Government has invested $50 billion in Citi. In the parlance of the venture capital world, we invested $50 billion in a company, and the “post-money” value is $18.3 billion. Suffice it to say that the “pre-money” value––the value of the company before the infusion of new capital––was a big negative number.

By any normal measure, Citi was insolvent. The common equity was worthless, but for the infusion of public money. So, all of the arguments of nationalization are somewhat academic. The federal government did not wipe out the common equity holders, the market did. If there is market value remaining, it exists only at the sufferance of the US taxpayers. The only question is what how the government should be asserting its rights and privileges.

In a normal world, an investor who bails out an insolvent company takes control of the board of directors––by one means or another. And any appropriate controls on executive compensation––on bonuses and the like––are subject to the control of the board, as they are in any corporation. But what seems to be broken in all that has transpired over the past few years, is that the fundamental concept of board control and corporate governance.

The notion is simple. A corporation is a company owned by stockholders. The stockholders elect a board of directors to serve their interests in the governance of the company. The board hires and fires the chief executive and the management team, sets compensation, and establishes corporate policy and the like.

But little has been spoken about the boards of the great American financial institutions that have brought the world economy to its knees. Sure, Robert Rubin has been silenced for his complicity as a member of the board of directors of Citigroup. But little has been said about the more fundamental issues, conflicts and failure of corporate governance that have occurred on our long march toward the abyss.

Richard Fuld, the CEO of Lehman Brothers, who demonstrated an astonishing lack of imagination as he sat before Congress and suggested that, even in the wake of the financial collapse, he could not think of a single thing that he would have done differently if he could do it all over again. Fuld served as both Chairman and CEO of Lehman Brothers, a not uncommon situation in corporate America where a CEO effectively reports to him or her self, evaluates his or her own performance and sets his or her own compensation.

If Lehman had been a partnership––as it was for most of its corporate existence––perhaps this conflict would be acceptable. But for a publicly traded company, this relationship violates one of the central tenets of corporate governance: That the CEO is accountable to the board of directors, and that the directors represent the interests of the stockholders.

AIG further illustrates the problem of the failure of board oversight. The collapse of AIG was directly a result of the company’s failure to understand the risks related to its burgeoning credit default swap business. The profits of the global insurance giant became increasingly tied to its credit derivatives business, run by Joseph Cassano, the head of AIG Financial Products. Yet even as Cassano represented that there was no risk of AIG losing “a single dollar” on any of its credit default swap transactions, no one on the board managed to ask the simple question of why sophisticated financial institutions––the counterparties on the other side of those transactions––would willingly pay AIG billions of dollars annually, if there was no risk of loss. Presuming that all of those sophisticated counterparties were not fools, a board member might have asked, how can that be?

Looking back over years of financial crisis and collapse, and one common thread has been the failure of board governance of public companies. The savings and loan debacle. The collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert. Enron. Each was characterized by boards who had lost site of their central purpose: To hire and fire the CEO, set corporate policy, and serve the shareholder interests.

Congress should take no action to set the terms of executive compensation. The problem that needs to be fixed is more fundamental: The failure of the fundamental governance structure of public companies. In the investment banking world––in the world of risk––perhaps it is time to return to partnerships and assure that when capital is at risk, people are too. But the days of the cozy, insider boards needs to end. The cost––to the shareholders and the public alike––is too high.

Whether or not the Treasury controls the boards of directors in companies where the common equity has been functionally wiped out is not the salient question, though certainly there is not a true capitalist in the country who would debate whether after a $50 billion investment into a $18.3 billion company, anyone but the US Treasury is entitled to control. The question is how board accountability and responsibility should be reestablished––both for the recipients of TARP funds and across the corporate landscape.

Sunday, November 23, 2008

Time to change the rules

Barack Obama has time to consider how his administration will minister to the ailing auto companies, as their demise will be protracted. In the real economy, failure takes time. Sixty days from now GM will still be there.

But the same cannot be said of Citibank.

Today, after investing almost half of the $700 billion appropriated by Congress to buttress the capital reserves of the banking system, the evidence suggests that the Treasury and the Federal Reserve have not achieved their goal of easing the cost or availability of capital. Instead, the major banks are cutting back credit, increasing fees and looking for ways to further solidify their balance sheets. Unless these trends are reversed, the concerted federal action will have been for naught, the recession will deepen and recovery will be forestalled.

More capital alone is not sufficient to fix the commercial banking sector, and a new injection of funds into Citibank will not allay the fear the continues to grip the system. Like Citibank, all of the commercial banks have problem loans and problem business lines, and, traditionally, new injections of capital would provide banks with the resources necessary to work out those issues. But today, the risks are different, and more dire.

The collapse of AIG two months ago highlighted for all market participants the risks presented by derivative contracts on the books of financial institutions. AIG’s demise came in a matter of days––if not hours––once its credit ratings were downgraded from the double-A level to the single-A level. On Friday, September 13th, AIG was in business. On Monday the 15th, AIG was downgraded. On Tuesday the 16th, the global insurance giant was effectively bankrupt.

In the case of AIG, the rating downgrades resulted from write-downs in its holdings of mortgage-backed securities––to comply with mark-to-market accounting rules––which depleted its capital reserves. The downgrades triggered collateralization requirements under the terms of its $450 billion portfolio of credit default swaps. Faced with demands for collateral that exceeded its financial resources, AIG was insolvent.

The lesson for the major commercial banks that face similar risks was simple: Do everything in your power to rebuild your financial strength and stabilize your credit ratings. Cut back lending, reduce outstanding credit facilities, increase fees, conserve capital, and rebuild your balance sheets. In sum, the lesson for the commercial banks is that if you want to survive––if you don't want to be the next AIG––you should not do any of the things--such as increase lending--that the Treasury is trying to get you to do.

Today, Citibank is rated AA-, which by any measure is a strong credit rating. But the markets are anticipating Citibank’s demise. On Friday, Citibank shares fell 20% to $3.77 and its total market value fell to $20.5 billion, a decline of 90% from a year ago, and less than the $25 billion that the US government gave Citibank just last month. In the credit default swap market, the cost of insuring against a Citibank default rose 20% on Friday.

In normal times, a downgrade to A+ would not be a catastrophic event for a commercial bank, but these are not normal times. While there has been no public indication from Citibank of what the financial consequences of a credit rating downgrade to single-A would be, Citibank is currently the guarantor on $1.6 trillion of credit default swap contracts––almost four times the size of AIG’s portfolio––and it is not unreasonable to imagine that those contracts have comparable collateralization terms. If this is AIG all over again, a downgrade of Citibank’s ratings would lead to the swift collapse of what one year ago was the nation’s largest bank.

But this is not just about Citibank. Over the next several days, the Treasury may announce its plans to pour billions more into Citibank. But even if Citibank survives, the Treasury will not have addressed the fear that is gripping the banks. For this, the Treasury and the Fed need to change the rules of the game: They have to tackle head-on the two issues that conspired to lead to AIG's swift collapse.

First, they should change the mark-to-market rules that have made the balance sheets of financial institutions captive of swings in asset market prices. These rules exaggerate the importance of unrealized gains and losses, and exacerbate economic volatility by undermining stability in the banking sector. Instead, consideration should be given to rules that allow for the smoothing of unrealized gains and losses over time, as is the case in pension fund accounting, to mitigate market volatility by recognizing gains and losses over a multi-year period.

Second, immediate regulatory action should be implemented, vitiating the linkage between changes in credit ratings and collateralization requirements under outstanding swap agreements. While changes in bond ratings have always had effect on an entity’s cost of capital over time, the rating agencies never intended for rating actions to trigger cataclysmic events. In fact, until the collapse of AIG, the collective impact of the collateralization triggers in swap contracts was barely recognized as a material risk factor for financial institutions. Any counterparty who objects to this change should be free to void the agreement to which they are a party.

With the implementation of these two steps––changes in the mark-to-market rules and removing the collateralization provisions from existing derivatives contracts––the Treasury can immediately reduce the pressure on Citibank and on other financial institutions. Then they can focus on the real job of recapitalizing the banking system, and perhaps the banks will get back to the business of lending.

Thursday, November 20, 2008

Bailouts. All the rage.

The debate over the bailout rages on.

On the one hand, the companies involved have only themselves to blame. No one denies that they brought this on themselves. The nation watches incredulous as the wealthy CEOs fly into the nation’s capital on their private jets and claim that it was not their fault––and begrudge anyone who suggests that their compensation should limited if they receive federal aid.

It is hard not to want to let them face the rigors of bankruptcy. Let others in their industry who did not make bad decisions reap the rewards of their strategic wisdom and take market share from those made bad choices. That is the way it is. That is the way it’s supposed to be.

Those arguing for the bailout question whether the economy can sustain the wreckage and havoc that will ensue if the companies are allowed to fail. They argue that rather than risk the widespread repercussions of a collapse, we should invest in the companies, shore up their financial condition, and hope they make better decisions going forward.

So we held a national debate and in the end, after the cajoling of Wise Men from across the Capitol, Congress and the President approved the $700 billion bailout for the finance industry.

We had a referendum on pain and our willingness to walk the walk of our capitalist principles, and we decided we just weren’t up to it.

Now come the automakers. It is like deja vu all over again. Once again, the companies have brought this on themselves. Once again, the wealthy CEOs fly in on their private jets, and show nothing approaching accountability for their circumstances.

And once again the fundamental question is whether the companies and their stakeholders will suffer for their own bad judgments, and whether their competitors who have demonstrated strategic wisdom will be allowed to take market share from those who made bad choices. The way it is supposed to be.

Those arguing for the Detroit bailout question whether the economy can sustain the wreckage and havoc that will ensue if the companies are allowed to fail. But this time, the resistance is fierce.

The hypocrisy of the moment is profound. This is not an argument for or against aid to Detroit, but against the hubris that now surrounds the debate. Would a debtor-in-possession bankruptcy process be a better choice over the long term to secure a better future for GM and Ford? Perhaps. Are other American automakers that are highly successful in the marketplace—Toyota, Honda, Nissan, BMW et al—disadvantaged by a government bailout? Sure.

And each of these arguments could have been made in the financial bailout. Like the automakers, the best efforts of Hank Paulson may just be delaying the day when Citibank succumbs, and newer, foreign-owned banks with a growing presence—Toronto Dominion, Banco Santander, FirstBank—emerge from the middle market to replace those at the top who fall under the weight of their bureaucratic indifference to the customer and their derivative-laden balance sheets.

As Joseph Schumpeter famously wrote, the process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is the driving force of innovation and growth. But as we are now witnessing, there is destruction and collateral damage along the way. Sometimes the damage is small and incidental, and sometimes the damage is cataclysmic.

We already chose not to face head-on the consequences of failure on Wall Street. Now, as the economy is coming undone, one has to question whether this is the moment to let GM and others fall under the weight of their legacy cost structures. The arguments for bankruptcy and the urgency of finally having Detroit make the real changes that are essential to its future are valid. But bailout opponents should not kid themselves into thinking that the process will be smooth or without collateral damage.

All of the obligations that GM will walk away from in bankruptcy—retiree healthcare, support for redundant dealerships, bond and lease payments for redundant facilities—are payments that someone else receives. Our essential challenge as we address the economic recession is to sustain economic activity and demand in the marketplace as consumers and companies reduce their spending. A GM bankruptcy will exacerbate this challenge and increase the costs to government at all levels to sustain economic activity and mitigate the collateral damage.

In many ways, our response to the auto industry is shaped by our response to the financial collapse. We rose to the urgency of that challenge, and now watch incredulous at the apparently arbitrary allocation of those billions of dollars of our money. Why has $150 billion been allocated to secure the interest of counterparties to AIG derivatives rather than simply to secure the policyholders? Why have we given tens of billions to the largest commercial banks only to see them cut back lending and increase banking fees? Why are we giving money to American Express––the lender to the richest Americans––while little is done for homeowners? Why have we rewarded failure and not instead mitigated collateral damage and allowed those who have been successful in the marketplace to win?

We have watched one bailout unfold, and we have not been impressed. We heeded the Wise Men, and now we feel violated.

But how do we now hold failing auto companies to a higher standard? And why now, when money is being tossed around the Street like confetti? Is it because this time the beneficiaries would be autoworkers and retirees rather than well-heeled moneymen, who to this day have yet to apologize to the nation for the destruction they have wrought?

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

Building US foreign policy in a networked world

Faced with a choice for Secretary of State between Hillary Clinton, Chuck Hagel and Bill Richardson, President-elect Obama’s choice should be clear. While all of them have strengths to serve the new president well, only Governor Richardson brings both a depth of experience and a philosophical commitment to Barack Obama leadership style.

Each of the candidates brings great strengths to the position. Hillary Clinton would bring unrivaled superstar status to the position, and provide unmatched energy and focus to push ahead the Obama foreign policy agenda. Like her husband, she is a pragmatist who will quickly grasp the nuances of every issue, and she will bring––as she does to all things––a tremendous motivation to succeed.

Chuck Hagel is a very different choice. He is a serious student of foreign policy and military affairs, with a deeply grounded understanding of the international world. Unique among the Washington crowd, Hagel understands and has spoken on the most serious foreign policy challenge that we face, which remains our relationship with Russia. Our ability to address all other international issues—Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, and financial integration and regulation—will be either facilitated or undermined by our relationship with our former adversary. Hagel understood immediately our error in embracing the Kosovar declaration of independence, which undermined the primacy and principles of international law, and the far-reaching consequences of that action, which continue to unfold. Hagel recognizes the importance of American leadership that embraces the world in all its complexity, particularly after years of hubris and empty threats that have eroded our credibility and capacity to lead.

But in Bill Richardson, President-elect Obama can choose a seasoned international diplomat and negotiator who truly embraces the core of Obama’s worldview. Like Obama, Richardson understands and has practiced a style of diplomacy and leadership that begins with listening, and that is grounded in the view that even as disparate parties may have widely differing agendas, the most complex and intractable conflicts can be addressed if differences are acknowledged and respected, as a first step toward identifying and achieving common goals.

In addition, Richardson would bring to the administration a broad network of relationships across the international community and an ability to take on the portfolio of State with no learning curve. From his time as UN Ambassador, to his range of assignments as an international negotiator during both Democrat and Republican administration, Richardson has built an international reputation for diplomatic skill, integrity and credibility.

Much has been made of this being a time of transition from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world. But this is not an accurate reflection of the world that President-elect will inherit. The US will remain the dominant military and financial power for decades to come. However, the significance of that status is what people expected it to be, and the world has not, and will not in the future, march to our tune on account of that power. The emergence of asynchronous warfare and strategy has proven to be an effective counterpoint to US military dominance, and years of US deficits have led to the emergence of China and other countries as powerful financial players, even if the dollar remains dominant in times of crisis. Today, our power gives us the capacity to lead, but will not compel others to follow.

The celebrations around the world that greeted the election of Barack Obama reflect the hope that positive and effective US leadership will reemerge in the world. But that leadership must reflect a new world of struggling and emerging democratic nations that will each need to chart their own politics and path forward. This is a world that will need American support, encouragement and direction, but will not respond well to hubris or dictates from foreign soil.

The world today is defined by overlapping networks. National identity remains elemental, but in almost every conflict across the globe, we are witnessing the influence of transnational linkages and networks that put a claim on community identity. Afghanistan, Georgia, Kenya, Kosovo, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Russia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Timor, Ukraine, Zimbabwe. All of these nations are facing conflicts where religious, ethnic, tribal and family identities are threatening the primacy national identity as a unifying force. These challenges will be exacerbated rather than solved by democratic reforms––national unity was easier to maintain at the point of a gun––and demand the development of national and transnational institutions to create legal, political and regulatory frameworks for the new century.

In this world, US leadership and policy will need to focus on multiple levels and strategies. At the highest level, the US must define and focus on its core strategic interests. This is and will always be its primary priority. At the same time, the US must implement policies that encourage and support regional networks and leadership to engage regional conflicts and issues. The world of emerging and evolving democratic states must, under American leadership, learn new skills in conflict resolution. And all roads will no longer lead to Rome.

This is a world that is ready for the leadership of Barack Obama, who built a political campaign based on a philosophy of uniting people with vastly differing identities toward common purpose. This is the world in which Bill Richardson has been immersed for decades. A world he understands from extensive personal experience, and one where, like Barack Obama, he is greeted warmly wherever he goes as one who has the knowledge, understanding and philosophical stance that can enable him to bring together even the most entrenched adversaries.

Saturday, November 15, 2008

Farther down the rabbit hole

The longer this goes on, the more absurd it is becoming.

Hank Paulson may know what he is doing. He may have insight that is lost on the rest of us. But then again, he might not.

It is not easy to suggest that a man with the pedigree and swagger of a former chairman of Goldman Sachs does not know what he is doing. But there it is.

Over the past few weeks, in the name of recapitalizing the banking system, we have witnessed the largest concentration of financial power and privilege in a century. Three of the new titans of the banking world––JPMorgan, Bank of America and Citibank––have emerged far larger and more powerful than before the financial crisis began. Their assets have ballooned. Regulation W has been waived, and FDIC deposits are now unfettered by restrictions put in place almost a century ago. And they have new infusions of taxpayer capital that some have unabashedly suggested will be used to acquire regional middle market banks and future expand their dominance in the marketplace.

Not to lose out on a good thing, American Express this week sought and received Fed approval to convert itself into a bank, so that they could get in on the action.

This, Hank Paulson suggested, marked the Government’s initiative to unlock the consumer credit market.

The irony, of course, is that these are not the institutions that will pull us out of the recession. These are not the institutions to which small businesses turn to finance the great American engine of job creation and growth. Those would be the community banks and middle market banks, that have largely eschewed the risks of derivatives and securitized obligations that have brought the larger institutions and hedge funds to their knees. And those are the institutions whose plight has been largely overlooked by the bailout strategies that Hank Paulson has pursued. Far from being helped, those institutions have been placed at a competitive disadvantage by the aggressive steps that the Treasury and the Fed have taken to concentrate financial power in a handful of dominant institutions.

We are now in the Alice in Wonderland phase of the financial bailout. The world of public policy has disappeared into the rabbit hole, and we have no idea where we are going to end up. But it is now clear that Hank Paulson has no idea either.

The greatest failure of the bailout has been in not letting institutions that did stupid things fail, and to focus public policy on how to mitigate the public and systemic consequences of that failure. In the case of Lehman Brothers, we failed to anticipate and prepare for the downstream consequences. But instead of learning the lesson that we must look down the road and anticipate systemic consequences, we turned our back on the core principle that failure is essential in competitive markets and exacerbated our problems in our approach to AIG.

The collapse of AIG came as a result of its exposure to the collateralization provisions of its credit default swap (CDS) business. To date, the bulk of the $150 billion federal cost of bailing out AIG has gone to making good on the collateralization obligations under those CDS contracts. Essentially, instead of protecting the AIG policyholders and otherwise letting AIG fail, and reaffirming the principle that stakeholders––from bondholders to CDS counterparties––are at risk in the marketplace, the Treasury chose to protect the rights of CDS counterparties with public dollars.

Halfway through the $700 billion, we are still facing two central problems. First, Paulson, Bernanke and Congress have yet to find a way to unravel the mortgage-backed securities market. The central issue here is that once mortgages are pledged in a pool to multiple investors, the terms of any individual mortgage cannot be renegotiated without impairing the contract rights of some of those investors. As a result, while mortgages held in whole by a single institution can be renegotiated, those that have been securitized may not be able to be fixed. This means that for a subset of mortgages, a foreclosure process may not be avoidable. If this is the case, federal policy should address the affects of foreclosures on families and communities, and let the process of unwinding the CDO market work itself out.

Second, the risk that credit default swap contracts present to the financial system has to be recognized and addressed. CDS contracts are essentially insurance policies against financial loss on bonds, where one party pays a premium to the other party, who agrees to make them whole in the event of a bond default. The issues are twofold. First, there is no regulatory framework that regulates the capital reserves that an institution must hold to write this type of insurance. Second, there is no requirement that the purchaser of the insurance actually own the bond in question, and there is no limit to the amount of insurance that can be written against any given bond. As such, the CDS market has become a purely speculative market that––as Michael Lewis suggested in his magnificent epilogue to Liar’s Poker––allows investors to make side bets in the bond market without actually investing any money. It is, simply state, a market with infinite leverage.

JPMorgan, BofA and Citi have approximately $13.7 trillion of credit derivatives outstanding, in compared to total combined assets of $3.9 trillion, while JPMorgan alone has approximately $7.9 trillion outstanding, in compared to total assets of $1.4 trillion. These banks will argue that their derivatives “book” is evenly balanced between long and short positions. But this ignores the fact that AIG did not collapse because of its exposure to the credit events in its CDS portfolio, but rather because of the collateralization requirements that ensued in the wake if its bonds being downgraded below “AA.”

Today, these three banks are rated "AA," with at least two of them facing downward pressure on their ratings. However, it is likely that even JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon––the reigning superstar of the financial firmament––does not know how much collateral JPMorgan would be forced to post to their CDS counterparties in the event they were to be downgraded. But suffice it to say that each of these banks have CDS books that are several times larger than that of AIG, and any such downgrade would likely wipe out their capital reserves.

Even as Congress and the Treasury look for solutions to the mortgage foreclosure problem, they should act immediately on credit derivatives. Three steps are warranted. First, a complete industry database must be created to track contracts, exposure and collateral terms. Second, a regulatory framework must be created to establish capitalization and reserve standards. And third, similar to the insurance industry regulatory framework, the federal government should immediately levy the equivalent of an insurance premium tax on credit derivatives to fund the public costs of financial protections and regulation.

Today, insurance premium taxes are levied in the range of 5% of premium volume. If CDS pricing averages 200 basis points on the outstanding $62 trillion, a similar fee on the annual CDS payments would generate approximately $62 billion, and provide a reasonable start at amortizing the costs of the federal bailout. And perhaps, if the industry complained that the cost was too high, it would serve the higher purpose of providing an incentive to unwind the most highly leveraged sector of our financial system.

Sunday, November 02, 2008

The prospect of hanging concentrates the mind

“The prospect of hanging concentrates the mind.” Samuel Johnson.

After decades of fretting over the low American savings rate, Americans are putting away their credit cards and hunkering down for a long, cold winter. And the rest of the world is trembling at the thought.

The anticipation phase of this financial crisis is coming to an end. In a world of six-hour news cycles, people are beginning to realize that nothing is going to be fixed quickly. Last week’s god, Hank Paulson, is this week’s afterthought.

No, he did not fix it. No, he does not know what we should do with the $700 billion. No, he does not know what AIG did with the $100 billion. And no, he does not know what to do next.

Soon, people will turn off the cable news circus. The election will be over, and there will only be the uncertainty of what lies ahead.

For a president Obama—willing to turn the page on the Neoconservative rhetoric that has dominated American foreign policy of late—the financial crisis will offer a dramatic opportunity to reshape international relations, in positive and constructive ways. After all, the denouement of the crisis that is slowly placing a vice grip on nations across the world has brought a new clarity to international relations. And as each nation now looks out over the precipice, the hubris that has characterized the past few years may give way to a new willingness to build bridges.

In the early moments of the financial debacle, our allies in Europe—to say nothing of those across the world resentful of our new militarism—could barely conceal their satisfaction as the dollar fell, the price of oil rose and the end of the era of US dominance loomed. But that moment was fleeting before the interconnectedness of the 21st century economy became the dominant fact of the new world order.

Within a few short weeks, new realities emerged. As stock markets around the world plummeted—from 40% across Europe to 60% across Asia to over 70% in Russia, Ireland and Iceland—the interdependence and integration of national economies, and the ease of migration of capital, undermined newfound notions of prosperity from Ireland to Russia.

In European capitals, the ascendant notion of an economic decoupling from the United States fell by the wayside as nations quickly sought to protect their own interests and the euro crashed. In Russia, the collapse of energy prices demonstrated the fragility of an economy that has failed to build legal institutions and will soon show what little protection Russia’s new financial reserves can provide in the face of an international recession.

At the same time, for the United States, two dominant doctrines of the post-Cold War era have been discredited. First, the consuming conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the limits of overwhelming military power to force change and democratization. Second, the financial crisis and final capitulation of Alan Greenspan have demonstrated the limits of unfettered free markets and the power of uncontrolled ambition and greed to foment global chaos.

Today, the reality of economic interdependence can transform political relationships, as evidenced by our relationship with China. Two years ago, as Europe was trumpeting the emerging decoupling, China demurred. China’s communist leaders grasped the implications of the integrated international economy better than her European counterparts, and understood—as good Marxists—that economic imperatives trump traditional political arguments. China tightly linked her currency to the dollar and, after decades of saber rattling, has now tempered her threats to take back Taiwan by force.

Our relations with China are a marked contrast to our relations with Russia. For years, we have dealt with China quietly and respectfully—despite domestic protests regarding Tibet and religious persecution. With Russia, nothing has been quiet or respectful, but rather our policy has been long on hubris and trapped in Cold War rhetoric, if not ideology.

In early October, Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Moscow, where she announced that Germany would oppose efforts to admit Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. Her announcement has offered the US an opportunity to step back and reframe our relations with Russia. A new administration will now have the ability to rebuild our relationships with Russia, as with many other countries, on principles that reflect the new economic realism of international economic integration and our own understanding of the limits of military power. Simply stated, Russia—as China has accepted—can no longer impose her will at the point of the gun, while we must lead with a tempered rhetoric in a world where tanks alone cannot achieve our goals.

The strength of the dollar in a time of global crisis has reaffirmed the critical role of American leadership—to say nothing of the importance to the rest of the world of a vibrant American economy—to others. At the same time, an end to American hubris and a touch of the humility that George W. Bush once embraced, may allow us to provide the leadership that the world now desperately needs.

For a new president who grasps how dramatically the world has changed in the past month, and who appreciates both the complexity of international economic integration and national identity, this will be a time of unprecedented opportunity.

Monday, October 13, 2008

The twilight of John McCain

The fact that Bill Kristol’s advice to John McCain is being taken seriously is itself nothing short of comical.

When McCain secured the Republican nomination in the spring, many patriotic Americans sighed felt a sense of relief. While John McCain could not be counted on the bring balance to a Supreme Court heavily weighted with Republican nominees, he was a men of integrity and credibility as a national politician who would stand against the most partisan forces, and act in the broad national interest.

That is to say, he would be a departure from the last eight years. Eight years that have greatly damaged our nation. Economically we are deep in debt and our financial system is teetering on the brink of collapse. Militarily we are overstretched and hamstrung in our ability to respond to new threats. Internationally, we have lost much of our credibility in the world and our capacity to lead—at a time when centered leadership is badly needed and hard to find. And morally, our embrace of torture as a tool of national policy has undermined the national character that has been part of our strength in the world.

But it was John McCain himself, not some Washington cabal as Kristol suggests, who brought McCain’s candidacy to its current state of affairs. Despite his attack ads accusing Barack Obama of Unbridled Ambition, it is John McCain who cast his faith in the American people to the wind, and tried to remake himself in the mold of George W. Bush.

It is John McCain who cast aside his principled opposition to torture as a tool of public policy in an effort to reach out to the Party base.

It is John McCain who cast aside his opposition to tax cuts that benefited the rich and drained the national treasury in a time of war, to embrace new and deeper tax cuts in an effort to gain the affection of the Party base.

It was John McCain who reached out to evangelical leaders—not just evangelical voters—and muted his opposition to their contribution to the destruction of civil discourse in our society and in our politics.

It is John McCain who cast aside his long-time political advisors––who had help craft the McCain Brand that stood for integrity and straight talk that was critical to his success as a national candidate—and hired in their place his current team of Bush era and Rove-trained advisors, who have cut him off from the press and done much to destroy the essential character that—we thought—set John McCain apart from other candidates.

And finally, it is John McCain who failed to stand up to his new campaign team and select the centrist vice-presidential candidate of his choosing—Joe Lieberman or Tom Ridge—and elevated in their stead a candidate who lacked any of the core attributes of experience and wisdom that he valued above all else.

Above all else but winning, it seemed.

John McCain is a man driven by his political instincts, and by a sense of decency in the public square. But he has proven in this campaign—despite the profound irony of the Country First slogan—that this time around, he was going to do what it takes to win.

Many supporters looked at the Palin nomination as the final moment when McCain himself could pivot toward the center. Palin would be sent out to placate the base, while McCain would return to the ground on which he is most comfortable. Openness. Candor. The politics of the center over the braying of the extremes.

But this is not the choice that John McCain made. Not this time. Instead, McCain lost his bearings. Perhaps it the roar of the supporters who turned out to see Sarah Palin. Perhaps it was the anger at being upstaged by young, stoic and unflappable Obama. But rather than veering to the center, McCain embraced a new populism and raged against the machine.

His campaign strategy changed week to week. Day to day. His rhetoric has become shrill and pandering, disconnected to any core message or program.

I’ll get Osama bin Laden… I know how to do it.

I will lower gasoline prices.

I know how to lower food prices.

I can fix this financial crisis. I know how to do it.

I know how to fix Wall Street.

This race is about Main Street vs. Wall Street.


There have been hints of old McCain from time to time, as he has shown discomfort with the quality of the campaign rhetoric, and has balked at elements of his newfound strategy. But as much as Bill Kristol would like to deflect the responsibility from his candidate, the failure of the McCain campaign rests firmly with the candidate.

Now, as the Barack Obama as un-American Terrorist Sympathizer strategy has failed, the McCain campaign is making a belated effort to return to the McCain Brand: John McCain as courageous and measured centrist, who will bring balance to the Democratic majorities in Congress and steady leadership to a the nation in its hour of need. Finally, John McCain will reach out to the large political center, where once he found succor and support, and which in the sunset of the Bush era has once again emerged as the key to electoral success.

But it is too late for that. John McCain chose personal ambition over principle and trust in the American people. He took his beloved brand and tossed it to the gutter. His integrity and credibility—all one has in politics—have been destroyed. Instead of centered and wise, he has proven to be fickle and petulant and impetuous.

We will never know which is the real John McCain. But he alone is responsible for where he finds himself today. All he has left is to consider his legacy.

Saturday, October 11, 2008

Credit default swaps and the crisis of confidence

Five years ago, billionaire investor and American icon Warren Buffett suggested that financial derivative products were “financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”

Five years ago, few people were paying attention, and even fewer understood what he meant. Even today, as the term credit default swap (CDS) is migrating from the financial cable networks to CNN, MSNBC and the mainstream media, the critical role of these arcane derivative products in the undoing of the financial markets is not well understood.

The term derivative product is a general term for a contractual agreement between two parties whereby the counterparties exchange––or swap—payments based some underlying benchmarks, applied against a contract notional amount.

The most widely used derivatives are interest rate swaps, which account for more than 75% of the global $530 trillion derivatives market, compared to the 10% that comprise credit default swaps. In its most basic structure, an interest rate swap provides that Party A will pay Party B an amount equal to a fixed interest rate times the contract notional amount, and receive an amount equal to a variable interest rate times that same amount. Many businesses that borrow money from commercial banks at the variable prime rate use interest rate swaps to fix their annual cost of borrowing and avoid interest rate risk.

In contrast, credit default swaps are financial products that allows for the transfer of the default risk related to owning a corporate bond from one party to another. For example, imagine that before the current market meltdown, CalPERS––the large California public pension fund––owned $100 million of IBM bonds, but wanted to insure against the risk of a bond default. CalPERS could accomplish this by negotiating a $100 million, five-year credit default swap with AIG––which up until a month ago was a global, triple-A rated financial institution.

Under the terms of the swap, CalPERS would make an annual swap payment to AIG equal to––for example––1% of the $100 million swap notional amount. In return, AIG would pay CalPERS the amount of any losses that CalPERS realized in the event of a default by IBM. For example, if IBM went bankrupt during the contract period, and bondholders were only repaid twenty cents on the dollar, AIG would pay CalPERS $80 million. And to secure AIG’s obligations, the swap contract would require that if AIG were downgraded from triple-A level to below double-A, AIG would post collateral equal to 20% of the notional amount of the swap contract, or $20 million.

Then came the AIG collapse.

While the general view of the AIG collapse is that it was a function of collapse of the mortgage-backed securities market, in truth it was a direct consequence of AIG’s CDS exposure. Four weeks ago, AIG was a triple-A rated insurance company. Today, it is being dismantled. If AIG had large investment losses in mortgage-backed securities, but no CDS exposure, AIG would still be in business today.

In simple terms, AIG’s collapse came as a result of the following sequence of events:

1. In the wake of the decline in real estate prices, the market value of mortgage-backed securities declined.
2. Under accounting rules that were established after the downfall of Enron––implemented to require rapid disclosure of investment losses––AIG marked down the value of its mortgage-backed securities portfolio.
3. These investment losses resulted in a reduction of AIG’s capital reserves––the core measure of its financial strength.
4. As a result of the decline in AIG’s capital reserves, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Service downgraded AIG from triple-A to the single-A level.
5. These rating downgrades to the single-A level triggered collateralization requirements under AIG’s CDS contracts.
6. The amount of the collateral that AIG had to produce under its estimated $450 billion of CDS contracts approximated $100 billion.

And AIG did not have $100 billion in available funds.

This was the explosive event that destroyed AIG. It was not the market losses on its investments in mortgage-backed securities. It was not payouts on CDS contracts where default events had actually occurred. It was a collateral call.

The AIG story illustrates two important aspects of the current crisis of confidence within the financial markets. First, AIG’s collapse in a matter of days resulted from the collateral requirements under the terms of contracts that are opaque, unregulated and difficult to track on corporate financial statements. As Buffett and others have suggested, the risk in the AIG derivatives portfolio was explosive—and ignored until it was too late.

Second, the AIG story illustrates how a collateral call under a CDS contract can have the effect of positioning the CDS counterparty—the institution on the other side that claims rights to the collateral—senior to the AIG policy holders and bondholders.

As US and European central bankers are working to define a collective strategy to rebuild confidence in the financial system and to reinvigorate inter-bank lending, the destabilizing impact of the CDS market remains one of the central problems to be addressed.

The problem seems straightforward. After the AIG collapse, how does one institution trust its exposure to another? If CitiBank seeks a loan from JPMorgan, how does JPMorgan know whether some event might be looming that will result in a collateral call under some of the myriad derivatives contracts to which CitiBank is a party, a collateral call that in a matter of hours could bring Citibank to its knees.

The US has now signed on to the British plan to make direct investments in banks, but simply injecting liquidity and capital will not address this concern. But US officials appear to be resisting the second British proposal––which provides for direct central bank guarantees of inter-bank loans. Like guaranteeing deposits, guaranteeing inter-bank loans would transfer the risk of the unknown from the banks to the central banks.

Paulson and Bernanke may view this last British proposal as one step too far in the socialization of the financial system. But until the CDS market is brought into an effective regulatory framework and the legal rights of creditors are clearly established, do we really have any choice but to take this next step?

It seems that long ago—weeks maybe—we stared the moral hazard issue in the eye. And we blinked.

Whatever the theoretical importance of letting people and institutions fail, it seems that we have already decided that as a matter of public policy and political priorities, we just can’t take the pain.

Saturday, September 27, 2008

Deleveraging society

It remains unclear at this moment if there will be a resolution of the impasse surrounding the proposed $700 billion bank bailout bill. Since negotiations fell apart on Thursday, House Minority Leader John Boehner—with a brief cameo of John McCain—has been leading a phalanx of disgruntled House Republicans in opposition to the Main Street bailout of Wall Street.

Were that the situation was so simple.

The House Republican rerun of Pat Buchanan’s Peasants with Pitchforks routine would be charming, if it were not so off base. This financial crisis, while being billed as a Wall Street bailout, is all about Main Street. And if the House Republicans want to see the roots of this crisis, they need only look in a mirror. This crisis is all about debt. It is all about us.

Over the past quarter century—dating to the dawn of the Reagan Revolution in fact—America has become awash in debt, and sub-prime home mortgages are just the tip of the iceberg. Home mortgages. Credit cards. Auto loans. Business loans. Federal debt. As shown below, since 1980, our public debt has grown ten-fold, from $4.4 trillion to over $45 trillion


Somehow, in the early days of the Reagan years, one fundamental premise did not take root. While Reagan era luminaries such as David Stockman and Grover Norquist trumpeted about the notion that cutting revenue would lead inexorably to cutting expenditures, they underestimated the character and adaptability of the American political system. The abiding lesson of the Reagan years was not that Americans—people of thrift and hard work we were told—would embrace a government that did less for them so they could do more for themselves, but rather that there is nothing that we used to pay for with cash and hard work that we cannot instead pay for with debt—and leave for some future generation to deal with in the distant future.

Turns out, we are not as virtuous as we like to believe.

As illustrated below, our indebtedness—not just as a government but as a society—took off. As a percent of our national income, our cumulative debt burgeoned from a stable level of around 150% of GDP to 350% and counting.


As a nation, we have ceased to save, and—political rhetoric notwithstanding—we have never seriously considered that we should stop spending.

As we are getting in deeper and deeper debt, and as our national savings rate has declined to near-zero, we rely almost exclusively on foreigners to provide us with capital to fund our excessive public, private and corporate spending habits.

In addition, as the chart below illustrates, our growing debt is also increasingly owned by countries—China and Russia most notably—who are often our adversaries in international affairs. This fact was evident in the Fannie and Freddie bailout a few weeks ago, when Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson took pains to avoid any action that would diminish the value of the Fannie Mae bonds held by the Chinese, even as he wiped out the value of the preferred stock held by domestic banks.

Therefore, our growing indebtedness is quickly obliterating the dividing line between domestic fiscal policy and foreign policy. Like any debtor, we will increasingly have to temper our behavior in order to not get cross-wise with our creditors. If any of these holders of our bonds should decide to dump our paper or even move to diversify their central bank reserves out of US government securities, the dollar will fall further and our long-term interest rates will rise.


Our growing borrowing from abroad is a function of our continuing federal fiscal deficits, as well as our trade deficit—the difference between what we export and what we import. These two amounts together comprise our “current account” deficit, and generally reflect the amount of capital that we import every year to fund our public and private expenditures that we cannot pay for from governmental revenues, export earnings or out of our own annual savings.

The problem that we face is our growing addiction to debt as the driver of national income growth. The graph below presents the growth in national Gross Domestic Product over the past several decades, and illustrates the portion of that growth that can be accounted for through imported capital or financing as reflected in the current account deficit.

This data suggests that imported capital has funded an increasing share of our year-over-year GDP growth, and that since the beginning of this decade, the nation has experienced little growth in national income beyond that which has been purchased by borrowing against our future. While in all fairness, the current account deficit is not an exact proxy for imported capital—a portion of the trade deficit, for example, reflects accounting and other transactions—but the gist of the argument remains. The share of our annual GDP growth that is derived from infusions of foreign capital has been growing steadily over the course of this decade—the red line taking over the green—to the point where nearly all of our annual growth has been derived from foreign borrowing.

We are no longer a nation that is paying our own way and in control of our financial destiny, but rather have become addicted to increasing uses of debt to financing our way of life. These are not the characteristics of a great nation or a great people.


The obvious question for the next president will be how to change course. The crisis we face is not how to fix a banking crisis, but rather how to deleverage a society that has become increasingly dependent on debt and imported capital.

Historically, the traditional fix to excessive debt is inflation. As inflation grows, the borrowed dollars are paid back in a devalued currency.

And that strategy appears to be in play already. As this final graph illustrates, the decline in the dollar over the course of the decade against the Euro, and increasingly against the Chinese Renminbi will allow us to pay these countries back with a currency that will be worth far less to them then the currency they originally lent to us. If this seems a bit confusing, just consider that in 2001, oil was priced at $20 per barrel, compared to around $100 per barrel today. That illustrates the extent to which the dollars that we are using to pay back our borrowing are worth less in value—80% less in the case of oil value—than the dollars they lent to us a few years ago.


The risk, of course, is how long our international creditors will play this game with us, and when they will look to protect their own financial interests and be a bit less lenient in funding ours.

So as John Boehner and the House Republicans claim that they are looking out for Main Street, while decrying the abuses and profligacy of Wall Street, a long look in the mirror might serve them—and the rest of us—well. There are no innocents in this crisis, and the longer we refuse to look honestly at our complicity in the creation of this crisis, the steeper the cost will be of setting things right.

Wednesday, September 24, 2008

Plan B

Email query from the Caribbean:

Dem bald man say, You gotta give us $700 billion by Friday.
Dem beard man say, We’ll get back to you on the rest of this.
Dem bank man say, No vote now, sky gonna fall.
Dem law men say, F--- y'all. If Monday show and we still here. Wat den?


It is, of course, all a confidence game.

Markets are a confidence game—perhaps trust is a better word—built on the belief that tomorrow will come around and it will be a lot like today. That buyers and sellers will show up. That the rules will be enforced. And most trades are completed on a handshake.

And politics is a confidence game. Despite all the appearances of a knife fight, it is not unlike a trading floor. Deals are made on a handshake, and you are only as good as your word.

Today, the two games are joined. 535 members of Congress have to take the measure of Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke. More than anything, the members detest and resent having their backs pushed up against the wall.

Deep down, they suspect this is just a Wall Street gangbang, as the banks push to include credit card receivables and other questionable assets in the grab bag, as the lobbyists swirl around looking for the greatest payday in the history of paydays, and as the CEOs with their homes in the Hamptons call to plead their case.

More than anything, the members cannot abide being told they have forty-eight hours, and they have no choice.

But what if they demur. What if through the peculiarities of the vote, the votes aren’t there.

Perhaps the members of the Republican Study Committee hunker down and decide to vote their convictions, and demand that investors and homeowners alike pay for their bad decisions.

Perhaps Bernie Sanders and the smattering of liberals not yet co-opted by the Democratic Leadership Council put their foot down on the principle that public aid must come at the price of public ownership.

And then the broad swath of the Center, cringing in embarrassment at being upstaged by the principled fringe, heed the populist call and abandon the Paulson Plan.

What then indeed?

Congress would look for a Plan B. And perhaps Plan B would focus on the underlying mortgages that are the root of the problem, rather than simply bailing out the financial intermediaries. After all, the fundamental problem with the mortgage-backed securities market is the lack of good information. With good information—however bad the news—liquidity would return to that market. Securities would find their appropriate market level.

Under a Plan B, Congress might create an interim insurance facility that would guarantee a portion of CDO cashflows—pending a workout of the underlying mortgages. Congress could direct the HFA and state mortgage finance agencies to work with troubled homeowners to restructure the terms of their mortgages, perhaps swapping a portion of the mortgage value for an equity share in future sale proceeds, to keep people in their homes and recoup some value over time. They could give bankruptcy judges the right to recast mortgages in default. And they could score political points by directing the FBI to focus on fraud and corruption in the finance industry.

For its part, the Fed window would be flung wide open for the banks and others who did not make bad choices to grab market share from those who did. And the market would do what it is supposed to do. Those who made bad choices suffer. Those who did not do well.

And there is a lot of money to be made on the hundreds of billions of CDOs that Paulson and Bernanke proposed to purchase for $700 billion, once information on the underlying assets is confirmed and value can be determined. Under Plan B, however, these profits would flow to hedge funds and private equity groups that would move in to acquire the illiquid assets that are now being marked to market at levels well below their real value. With aggressive federal action to validate and fix the underlying mortgages, a market for these securities would reemerge, and, with the prospect of profits to be made, every incentive will be in place to find and fix the underlying mortgages.

The problem, of course, is that Plan B is purely hypothetical. And it means that Monday morning would come without a fix in place. It means facing down the two wise men and their bailout plan and playing a game of chicken. And watching to see if the sky falls.

And there could be a lot of pain in the short-term. And in this case the short-term is the forty days before 435 members of Congress get their report cards from their constituents. Better to cast a vote for $700 billion and blame the bald guy if it fails, than bet on Plan B, even if, in the long-run, Plan B might be the right choice.

After all, as Lord Keynes famously said long ago, in the long-run, we are all dead.

Tuesday, September 23, 2008

The Gordian Knot

The swift demise of American capitalism did not arrive as imagined by John Dos Passos—farmers with pitchforks linked shoulder-to-shoulder with the urban proletariat, marching on Wall Street to tear down the House of Morgan—but rather at the urgings of America’s leading financiers, who have cast aside their dog-eared copies of Atlas Shrugged and are now looking to the Government, with pleading in their eyes and fear in their hearts, in the hope that someone can clean up the mess and make things right again.

It is truly a Gordian Knot that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke are seeking to unravel, with threads that are interconnected and entangled.

Last Thursday evening, the two men met with leaders of Congress, and by all accounts left them speechless, as they described the cataclysm that might yet unfold. Though the meeting was not public, one can imagine how the presentation might have unfolded.

Paulson and Bernanke began by offering a timeline of events as the markets spiraled out of control—perhaps using AIG as Exhibit A. They described how the housing bubble, irresponsible lending and borrowing practices, and complex mortgage securitization structures led to the issuance of billions of dollars of securities that were vulnerable to a downturn. They explained how, as the housing market deteriorated, the mortgage-backed securities lost value and became illiquid. Under accounting mark-to-market rules established after the Enron collapse, the banks recognized these losses. As losses grew, the firms lost their capital reserves, their strong bond ratings, and their access to low-cost capital. Panic ensued. Banks and other financial institutions stopped lending as they moved to conserve cash. Short-term interest rates shot up in a matter of hours.

Almost overnight, the world lending markets dried up.

Paulson and Bernanke then pointed to two non-financial events that illustrated the public panic that would ensue if action were not taken to stanch the downward spiral.

The first event was the swift run on money market funds—nearly $90 billion withdrawn in one day—that came in the wake of the Fed’s decision not to bail out Lehman Brothers. Clearly, Paulson and Bernanke failed to anticipate the impact of a failure by Lehman on money market funds that invested in its commercial paper, and the run on money market funds that ensued after one fund, the Primary Fund, “broke the buck” and passed on its losses in Lehman paper to its money market fund investors.

The second event was contemporaneous run on AIG offices in Asia, where insurance policyholders frantically sought to cash in their policies prior to the looming collapse of the insurance giant. Facing public unrest, Asian central bank officials—who happen to be the largest holders of US Treasury securities—contacted Washington with some succinct advice: Fix it.

But as harsh as these real world examples are of the unraveling that might ensue if Paulson and Bernanke are not successful, there is a more troubling scenario that might have stunned Congressional leaders into silence. Perhaps, Paulson and Bernanke then turned to the problem that surfaced just as AIG teetered on the brink, before Paulson rushed in to buy the company last week.

AIG, like Lehman and Bear Stearns, is a major participant in the credit default swap market. The CDS market links buyers and sellers of corporate default risk, and offers the holders of corporate bonds the ability to sell the default risk associated with those bonds to a counter party. And as in most derivative contracts, credit terms are agreed to pursuant to which each party agrees to collateralize its obligations to the other party with Treasury securities, should its own credit be downgraded.

According to public accounts, just before the takeover, AIG had a collateral call on $60 billion of CDS contracts that required that the company immediately post $15 billion of Treasury securities as collateral, and anticipated a similar demand under a further $380 billion of its CDS contracts.

The $15 billion collateral call would have had an immediate impact on all of AIGs creditors and policyholders, as it would give the CDS counterparties a prior claim on those funds, putting their claims ahead of the range of other AIG creditors. A comparable collateral call on the other $380 billion of CDS contracts would have increased the aggregate collateral call to $100 billion, wiping out the company’s resources.

$100 billion of US Treasuries. That's 2% of the total volume of US Treasury securities. In the world.

What Paulson and Bernanke might have pointed out to the Congressional leadership, is that there are $62 trillion of CDS contracts currently outstanding—among American and international commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, pension funds and others. $62 trillion of uncharted obligations with attributes of debt to one party and a high-stakes gamble to the other.

$62 trillion. An amount greater that the $54 trillion gross domestic product of the entire world, as estimate by the World Bank.

On Sunday House Minority Leader John Boehner declined to describe the words that silenced Congressional leaders at the meeting, noting that there are certain things that you don’t discuss in public. Illiquidity in the banking system is something you can discuss. A run on money funds that was staunched you can discuss.

A universe of $62 trillion CDS contracts—defaults on which can send participants scrambling to seize collateral and protect their interests—derivative products whose terms and conditions are not subject to regulation or supervision—financial obligations once described by Warren Buffet as financial weapons of mass destruction—the impact of which no one really understands.

That is something you don’t talk about on the Sunday talk shows.

It is too much to grasp, really.

Friday, September 12, 2008

God's wars

It is five in the morning and I am wide-awake.

Nothing keeps me up at night. I have always been a sound sleeper, never one to get up and read in the middle of the night. That would be my wife. But it is five in the morning and I am wide-awake.

I have not written on the Sarah Palin nomination prior to now, frankly, because I did not feel I knew enough. I have worked with many Governors, and other politicians, and I am quite comfortable that people can surprise you. You just don’t know. I did not have a sense of how she thinks, and I did not have a sense of how she carries herself.

The strongest signal to me were comments from Gary Bauer, and his enthusiasm for her based on her stance on a vary narrow set of issues. I know as a general matter that if Gary Bauer feels one way on something, I am bound to end up on the other side.

But her comments in her interview with Charles Gibson on ABC—and equally her lack of humility—on foreign policy were astonishing. She dissembled on the question of whether the Iraq War is a task from God. I had watched the whole video of her speaking before a church audience and she was not—as she suggested—arguing, as Lincoln did, that she meant only that we should hope we are on God’s side. His remark was made when considering the devastation and horror of the Civil War, and was a statement of humility in the face of horror.

But that comment was not decisive, as none of us would like to be held to account for every public utterance.

Rather, it was her comfort with war—combined with a very simplistic view of events. Hers is a Manichean worldview, of those who are for us and those who are against us. That is what pierced through. Her answers were largely scripted, but underlying the script, her comfort with that world shone through to me.

She brings a determined fervor to her comments that suggest that war with Russia would be a fine notion, if it grew out of an obligation to Georgia. She offered no sense that Russia’s volatility was a foreign policy challenge to be managed with the goal of avoiding war.

Last week, Dick Cheney described our conflict with Russia as one that pitted them against the “Free World.” Harkening back to the days of us vs. the Communists, he spoke with the certainty of a great ideological warrior.

The problem is that we are no longer in a great ideological war. The Berlin Wall is gone, the Iron Curtain is no longer, and however imperfect their democracy, Russia's future must now be guided by the Russian people. Russia is a capitalist nation, part of the world economy, and an integral trading partner with Europe and Asia, just as we wanted them to be. Our relations with them are no longer black and white, and the challenges with them are as they are with all nations, about how we navigate power, self-interest and mutual interest.

Eight years ago, George W. Bush preached humility in the world, and it masked his sense of good and evil in the world that has informed his conduct of foreign policy. Sarah Palin came across to me as a true believer, equally comfortable with a righteous sense of good and evil, but lacking Bush’s political sense to keep it under wraps—or Lincoln’s deeply rooted understanding that even as one must fight battles, the certainty of good and evil is never so simple.

I suspect that is why she appeals to Gary Bauer, and why it is five in the morning and I am wide-awake.

Wednesday, September 10, 2008

Country first

Got some blowback from the last piece on our fiscal situation. Some have questioned my mental health for suggesting that whatever our financial mess, it is inconceivable that a Democrat could do anything but make it far worse. Whatever the cause, it is not the Republicans.

It is Congress, they pass the money bills! It is old people and the AARP! It is Democrats who love to spend!

This argument reflects the old adage that, “If you aren’t a Democrat in your 20s you have no heart. If aren’t a Republican in your 40s you have no brain.” However, while Newt Gingrich and others worked hard to change the first part, the Republican Party long ago abandoned its principles of fiscal conservatism that were the root of the second part.

In the 1970s, as the Republican Party was embracing supply-side economics and jettisoning its long-held, conservative fiscal principles, Milton Friedman cautioned his Republican colleagues not to be disingenuous. Despite the tax-cut rhetoric that was becoming the Party’s new mantra, the true size of government is measured by spending, and fiscal deficits are simply deferred tax increases. To cut taxes and keep spending is not conservative, he insisted, it is simply dishonest.

As much as McCain supporters would like to cling to the notion that the Republican Party has remained true to its long-abandoned principles, the historical evidence does not support their argument. People, of course, are unlikely to change their political views based on actual data—and no right-thinking Republican would acknowledge that Bill Clinton and Robert Rubin did a better job on the economy that either George Bush and Michael Boskin—but the argument that Republicans are either the party committed to smaller government or balanced budgets is simply specious.

As illustrated in the graph below, going back forty years to 1968—the starting date for data readily available from OMB and the Congressional Budget Office—through twenty-four years of Republican leadership and sixteen years of Democrat leadership, the overall size of the federal government, as measured by total outlays, has remained largely constant at 20% of the Gross Domestic Product—economic shorthand for the size of the US economy. Most notable during this period has been the growth of entitlement programs—primarily Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid—which have risen from 5.6% of GDP to 10.6% of GDP, and the concurrent 44% decline in discretionary spending, which largely comprises defense and domestic spending.



As this graph illustrates, the most dramatic decline in discretionary spending came under Nixon—the last Republican president elected as a traditional fiscal conservative before the Reagan Revolution—as defense spending declined significantly with the wind-down of the Vietnam War. Discretionary spending also declined under Clinton—who on fiscal matters famously pronounced “We are all Eisenhauer Republicans now"—though Republicans are always quick to take credit for Clinton's budget success, a claim that is not supported by the data presented below. And discretionary spending decreased modestly under Reagan, as defense spending rose while discretionary spending declined.

Under Jimmy Carter, overall discretionary spending was flat—defense spending rose a bit, while domestic spending fell—while discretionary spending rose as a percentage of GDP under Ford and George W. Bush.

The data shows that discretionary spending, and in particular domestic spending, fell under both Democratic presidents, while it rose under both Bush presidents. The data on the public debt is less ambiguous, as illustrated below. Here, the pattern is clear. The change in Republican Party doctrine to embrace of supply-side economics brought with it an acceptance of deficit spending and a build-up of the national debt as the price of growth—even if over the long-term the growth never brought the books back into balance.



As illustrated here, the national debt declined under Nixon—an old-time conservative Republican—as well as under Carter.

Fiscal deficits took off during the Reagan presidency, as the Reagan tax cuts were implemented without commensurate reductions in federal outlays. The public debt doubled as a percentage of GDP during the Reagan-Bush years. During the Clinton years, shrinking deficits and ultimately budget surpluses contributed to a decline in public debt. Finally, under George W. Bush, new tax cuts combined with war spending have contributed to renewed growth in the national debt.

Faced with the evidence that Republican presidents have left a trail of deficits and debt in their wake, supporters insist that deficits are the fault of Congress, and particularly of Congressional Democrats. But here again, the OMB data tells a different story. Executive budget recommendations and the impact of Congress on spending and deficits are tracked within OMB data beginning in 1982. The OMB data presents the executive budget recommendation, the actual deficit that was realized, and determines the extent to which the difference—generally a higher deficit—resulted from Congressional over-appropriation, economic conditions or technical factors.

The graph below illustrates the annual executive budget recommendation for each year, and the impact of subsequent Congressional action in red. While Congressional spending bills over-spent the executive recommendations in almost all years, the impact of this overspending was generally a fraction of the deficit starting point in the executive budget.



This data suggests that—as one would hope would be the case—that the primary driver of fiscal outcomes is the recommended administration budget, despite the desire to put our fiscal mess at the feet of Congress. During the period 1982-2007, administration budget recommendations contained average deficits of 10% of outlays, while the average impact of Congressional over-spending was 1.9% of outlays. Prior to the current administration, where the impact of Congress is overstated due to administration decision to keep war funding out of the executive budget and rely instead on supplemental appropriations, Congressional over-spending averaged just 0.8% per year.

Nor does the data support the notion that the fiscal culprit is the innate profligacy of Democrats. Congressional over-spending during years when Democrats controlled both houses of Congress averaged 0.4% of outlays, and averaged 0.6% when Democrats controlled both houses of Congress and the White House. During years when Republicans controlled both houses of Congress, overspending averaged 2.3% of outlays, and it averaged 4.6% when Republicans controlled both houses of Congress and the White House.

No doubt the McCain campaign will continue to push the time-honored attacks against the tax and spend Democrats. A visceral appeal against "Barack Reid Pelosi O'Biden." But they will offer no evidence to support their claims, because the Republicans long ago lost that high ground. The fact is that both parties spend; the difference is whether they pay for their spending, or borrow the money and push off the day of reckoning.

Then they will argue that their policies are pro-growth. And, of course, that is true. All things being equal, lower taxes are stimulative. But that is not supply-side magic, just the old school Keynesian economics that Friedman inveighed against. To argue that we must continue with the policies that have gotten us here, you have to answer the question of how and when will we stop digging ourselves into an ever-deeper hole, and why it will not be increasingly painful the longer we wait.

This is the dilemma that years of debt and deficits have left us with: there are few good choices left today.

But as our fiscal situation is weighing heavier—as each American family is now burdened with its $265,000 share of the new debts that the nation has taken on in the past seven years—it is past time that we move beyond the old rhetoric and acknowledge—as Milton Friedman suggested years ago—that continuing these fiscal policies is irresponsible.

We all know that cutting taxes is great politics, and we would all rather pay less than more, but isn't John McCain running on the principle that it is time to put the country first?