Saturday, April 30, 2022

Each day, Vladimir Putin reminds us what’s at stake.

Last July, Harvard Kennedy School homeland security analyst Juliette Kayyem raised the question of whether Russia’s persistent cyber and information operations against the United States should be viewed as acts of war. Specifically, she suggested that it was a “legal fiction” to treat cyber attacks differently from physical attacks against a nation. 


Kayyem made the case for changing our definition of warfare against the backdrop of a series of news stories earlier that year of successful Russian cyber operations against the United States. Last May, Russian operatives succeeded in shutting down the Colonial Pipeline, a fuel distribution system that delivers nearly half of the diesel, jet fuel and other petroleum supplies across the East Coast. A few weeks later, they shut down JBS, the world’s largest meat producer, which supplies 20% of the nation’s beef. Both shutdowns were brief, but the point was made: Russia had proven its ability to shut down critical elements of our economic infrastructure, should they choose to do so.


More ominous than either of those attacks, however, was the massive “SolarWinds” cyber attack a year earlier. Unlike the ransomware attacks on the Colonial Pipeline and JBS, SolarWinds was a long-term operation in which cyber operatives of Russia’s GRU Military Intelligence Agency and SVR Foreign Intelligence Agency created their own back doors into the networks of hundreds of major corporations. Among the notable aspects of the SolarWinds attack was that the cyber-warriors did not actually do any particular damage once inside corporate networks. Rather, their presence, burrowed deep inside the operations of major companies, raised fears of what they might be capable of doing, should the time come.


As significant as these cyber operations may have been, Russia’s most significant achievement in the cyber realm has been the effectiveness of efforts by the GRU and the Kremlin-directed Internet Research Agency in undermining social cohesion in, and the stability of, democracies in countries across Europe and here at home.


Kayyem’s argument last year that we were “at war” with Russia – or at least that Russia was at war with us – was hard for many to grasp. Even now, there is a surreal aspect of the Ukraine war. The barbarity of Russian assaults and the conduct of its soldiers on the ground seem to be a vestige of another era. The images of refugee families in colorful down jackets pulling their rolling luggage seems incongruous with our advanced, globalized world. It is a war without any apparent purpose in an era where war itself – old fashioned war, with tanks rolling across open field, cities fire-bombed, and families huddled in underground bunkers – seems to lack purpose.


Perhaps that explains why, even as Russia has been hell-bent on destroying our democracy over the past decade, we have treated its operations against us as criminal matters under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice rather than as acts of war. In the past four years, Robert Mueller and his team indicted twelve officers of the Russian GRU for election interference in 2018, and the Department of Justice indicted four members of the FSB – the successor agency to the KGB – and six members of the GRU for a range of cyber operations in the US and across the globe, though in each case those charged were Russian nationals who never set foot in an American courtroom. Even our response to perhaps the most infamous GRU cyber operation, dubbed “Sandworm,” was undertaken through a court-authorized law enforcement operation by the Department of Justice rather than by the military.


As the war in Ukraine has escalated, President Biden has insisted time and again that we are not at war with Russia. It is a stance that has been met with an extraordinary degree of unanimity from Republicans and Democrats alike. Two weeks into Putin’s invasion, speaking on Fox News Sunday, Connecticut Democratic Senator Chris Murphy commented “I think we need to be clear that we are not going to go to war with Russia,” while Iowa Republican Joni Ernst concurred. Over on ABC’s “This Week,” Florida Republican Marco Rubio summed up the consensus view: “It means starting World War III.” 


Yet even as the DC political establishment appeared unified in the notion that war with Russia is unthinkable, there were two groups who fully embraced Juliette Kayyem’s assertion that Russia’s acts against us constituted acts of war: the US and Russian militaries.


Dating back at least a decade, the Russian armed forces have embraced a doctrine referred to as “Next Generation Warfare,” which is fully aligned with Kayyem’s perspective. Next Generation Warfare views cyber, psychological, and information operations (a generalized term encompassing propaganda, social media and other activities designed to undermine social cohesion and political stability) as essential elements in a continuum of war-fighting tactics, at least as essential to achieving strategic outcomes as are troops on the ground. 


In October 2016, just as Russian information operations targeting the 2016 presidential election were in full swing, military analysts at West Point published a report describing Russian cyber warfare and destabilization operations – referred to as “gray zone hybrid threats” – as an essential element of Russia’s strategic warfare doctrine. Those analysts highlighted one salient aspect of gray zone hybrid threats: “aggressors use ambiguity and leverage non-attribution to achieve strategic objectives while limiting counter-actions by other nation states.” 


Said another way, by assuring ambiguity surrounding what was done, how it was done, and who was doing it, Russia’s destabilization operations have left political parties across Europe and here at home at each other's throats, with little focus on how it is that all of a sudden previously functioning democracies are sliding into disarray. If Robert Mueller achieved anything in his arguably failed tenure as special counsel for the United States Department of Justice following the 2016 election, many of those indictments laid out elements of the Russian operation in fulsome detail.


Suffice it to say, if Russia has been at war with us for the better part of a decade, as Kayyem argued, the evidence suggests that its tactics have been successful. Russia has demonstrated its cyberwarfare capabilities – and increased public anxiety accordingly – with respect to its ability to disable core infrastructure systems. Its information operations, as intended, have undermined our ability as a nation to respond to an external threat, as the analysis of gray zone hybrid threats suggests. And, most significantly, Russia’s efforts to undermine both faith in and commitment to democracy across a large share of the electorate have borne fruit. While historians may yet assess whether Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump or Mark Zuckerberg made the greatest contribution to the weakening of public faith in democracy in the United States, Russia’s success in turning profit-maximizing social media algorithms into weapons of mass destruction is unarguable.


The notion that the Colonial Pipeline and other cyber attacks represented the testing phase of an integrated military strategy became clear on the eve of Russia’s invasion. Energy “blackmail” – the ability to shut down natural gas pipelines, and turn off the lights and heat across Europe – has for years long loomed large as a weapon Russia could wield against European countries should it choose to do so. During the two-week period before the Russian military rolled into Ukraine, GRU hackers moved into high gear, launching an assault on liquified natural gas production facilities in the United States, operated by Chevron, Cheniere Energy, and Kinder Morgan, among others. Putin’s objective was straightforward: to shut off alternative sources of supply to Europe on the eve of the invasion, in order to maximize his leverage over the EU during the conflict to come.


None of this helps us resolve the fundamental dilemma of how to respond to a nuclear-armed state that believes itself to be at war with us, even if we don’t believe we are at war with them. This week, Putin’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov repeated Russia’s thinly veiled threats to use nuclear weapons should the West continue to arm Ukraine, and Russia find itself with its back against the wall. Like its cyberwarfare and information operations, the use of nuclear weapons is an integrated part of Russia’s warfighting doctrine. But unlike cyberwarfare and the like, no one questions whether the use of nuclear weapons would constitute an act of war. And, of course, the threat to use nuclear weapons is itself a gray zone tactic, designed to undermine the ability of Russia’s adversaries to sustain a cohesive response to its war with Ukraine.


The choice Putin is offering the world is stark. Either cede to him the right he has demanded to impose Russia’s will on its neighbors, or he will take the world into the abyss. 


But if there is a ray of hope, it is in the wake-up call Vladimir Putin has given the world. Just as his years of war against the West appeared to have borne fruit, and the liberal democratic order appeared to be losing ground across the globe – and just three months after he and China’s Xi Jinping declared victory for their authoritarian new world order – Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded us how much is at stake.

Follow David Paul on Twitter @dpaul. He is working on a book, with a working title of "FedExit! To Save Our Democracy, It’s Time to Let Alabama Be Alabama and Set California Free."

Artwork by Joe Dworetzky.  Follow him on Twitter @joedworetzky or Instagram at @joefaces. 

Monday, April 18, 2022

Inside Xi's thinking.

When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stalled early on, there was a moment of optimism that things might come to a quick end. Pundits imagined that the Russian people, disgusted by what was being done in their name and angered by the sight of their children returning home in body bags, would take to the streets and overthrow the despot and his oligarch minions who have preyed upon them for decades. Or perhaps, Lindsey Graham suggested, senior Russian military officers, forced into a war of folly by an egomaniacal leader, would step in. Or, surely, as sanctions against Russia continued to grow, Chinese Xi Jinping would rise to the occasion and force his Russian ally to step back, before the damage to the global economic order – and by extension China itself – became irreparable.

It was all an illusion, as it turns out. The Russian people – except perhaps for the younger, urban intelligentsia – appear to have rallied behind their President. And no one should be surprised; Russians have been weaned on oppression at the hands of tsars and commissars alike for literally centuries. Suffering is in their DNA; as is fear and resentment of the West that now animates Putin’s rising popularity. 


The notion that Russia’s military leaders might grasp the nettle and take matters into their own hands was similarly delusional. Even if there were a tight-knit cabal of military leaders who decided the moment had come to take Putin down, he is as well protected as any leader in the world by his Presidential Security Service of long-time loyalists. A master of the use of poison to dispatch his adversaries, Putin understands that physical distance is an essential defense against pandemic and putsch alike. 


And then there is China. Three weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, President Xi Jinping hosted Vladimir Putin in Beijing, where together they declared that the American Century had run its course. No longer, they asserted, would Russia or China live under the thumb of American dictates, or be bound by the web of international laws and treaties that limited their right to assert dominance over their regions of the world. For Russia, this meant the right to reassert its control over its “near abroad,” those territories that have defined its periphery dating back to the pre-World War I Russian Empire and into the Soviet era. For China, the clear references were to Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea. 


Xi and Putin intended for their deepening alliance and declaration of a New World Order to provide a new axis around which authoritarian regimes across the globe, and populist political parties pushing back against the liberal democratic world order, could rally. There is no small irony that in their declaration of victory of authoritarianism over liberal democracy , Xi and Putin felt that they had to give lip service to democracy as “a universal human value” over and over again. 


The leaders of two nations that have each been led for at least a thousand years by tsars and emperors and commissars – and in Russia’s case today, an emerging totalitarian dictator – who have never chosen to offer their citizenry a voice in who would lead them, felt that they had to assert their democratic bona fides. “The two sides note,” their Joint Statement claimed, “that Russia and China as world powers with rich cultural and historical heritage have long-standing traditions of democracy, which rely on thousand-years of experience of development, broad popular support and consideration of the needs and interests of citizens.” But those rhetorical flourishes were quickly rendered moot, as the brutal aggression of Putin’s forces exposed in real time the dark underbelly of authoritarian power: the interests of citizens be damned, there are no rules and few guardrails that can contain an autocrat armed with nuclear weapons. 


For western and Chinese analysts alike, Xi Jinping loomed as the only viable restraint on Vladimir Putin’s ambitions. Two weeks into the war, a number of Chinese analysts appealed to Xi to walk away from Putin in the name of China’s long-term economic interests. Like many in the western media, those commentators saw a quick end to the war, and no outcome for Putin in which Russia could survive as a great power. Accordingly, in their view, Xi had just a few weeks to make his choice, and should he fail to walk away from Putin and declare China’s commitment to the world order, the consequences for China would be dire. 


But those few weeks have now passed, and it has become clear that Xi is not going to walk back support for his partnership with Putin, but rather will let the war play out. But those few weeks have now passed, and it has become clear that Xi is not going to walk back support for his partnership with Putin. You would have thought we would have learned our lesson in North Korea – that Xi somehow was going to step in and solve a problem that vexed the United States – but as he has with Kim Jong Un, it appears Xi is going to let the war play out. Perhaps the consequences for the global economy will be significant, but it has become clear that Xi is watching events unfold with a different strategic calculus. One has to believe that when Xi chose to deepen his partnership with Putin – a man who had already been at war with Ukraine for the better part of a decade and had over 100,000 troops massed at the border – he had already contemplated both the benefits and the risks of how events might unfold. 


It is easy to imagine that Xi believed that if Russia succeeded in swiftly toppling the regime in Ukraine, while NATO cowered in their barracks, it would demonstrate the Achilles heel of the vaunted U.S. global network of military alliances: only countries with explicit security guarantees could rely on U.S. protection. With Putin having exposed this vulnerability, China would have expanded latitude to assert its will over Taiwan and the South China Sea. But equally important as seeing the upside should Putin succeed, Xi probably had also thought through the consequences should Putin fail in his war, and may have seen opportunities in that outcome for China as well: in the worst case, should Russia face crippling sanctions and isolation from global trade networks and financial systems, Russia would quickly become dependent on China as its main trading partner. 


Russia is a leading global supplier of myriad strategic natural resources – far beyond just oil and gas – and few things could offer greater advantages to the Chinese manufacturing colossus than having monopsony control over those resources. The opposite of a monopoly, where a single seller can dictate the price of a product, a monopsony is a situation in which a single purchaser can assert pricing power over the sellers of a product. For China, the implications of having monopsony power over Russia with respect to critical natural resources is that China would have the leverage both to dictate the prices it would be willing pay for Russian commodities – including demanding a steep discount below world market prices. Importantly, China would also have greater latitude to require that payment be in renminbi (Chinese currency) rather than dollars. 


Clearly, the world would push back against China playing both sides in the West’s economic war with Russia. The balancing act for Xi in such a scenario will be to sustain China’s access to Russia’s natural resources – effectively circumventing Western sanctions – while not facing sanctions of its own that might limit its ability to sell manufactured goods into the U.S. and European markets. This week, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned China of dire consequences, mirroring the words of Chinese analysts during the early days of the war, yet Xi may well conclude that the West would lack the stomach to try to isolate China as it has Russia, particularly after the war comes to an end and the world is looking to move on. After all, energy sales aside, Russia is a very small economy in the scheme of things – which is why the Western alliance and so many global companies have been willing to act in concert – while China is a dominant global economic power, a critical part of global supply chains (as we have all learned) and a key driver of global corporate profitability. More importantly, playing a high stakes game of chicken with the West would likely serve Xi’s political interests well at home, a consideration that would give him room to maneuver this time around. 


As Putin’s war grinds through its second month, it is increasingly evident that the worst may well be yet to come. None of the easy outs that pundits imagined early on seem likely to emerge, and Xi Jinping, in particular, appears to have no interest in being the West’s savior. At this point it is not even clear which outcome Xi actually prefers: that Putin win his war or lose it. One offers the prospect that, with Putin having tested the waters and found them tolerable, Xi will be able to act on his long-standing ambition to rejoin Taiwan with the mainland, while the other offers the possibility that Xi might effectively own Russia’s rich trove of natural resources, enabling China to take one more step toward its goal of surpassing the United States as the world’s dominant economy. 


And perhaps preference has nothing to do with it, as Xi cannot control what will happen in Ukraine. For Xi, simply seeing the opportunities that either outcome might offer may be all that matters, as both outcomes would bring him one step closer to his ultimate goal: to take his place alongside Mao Zedong as the paramount rulers in China’s long history.


Follow David Paul on Twitter @dpaul. He is working on a book, with a working title of "FedExit! To Save Our Democracy, It’s Time to Let Alabama Be Alabama and Set California Free."

Artwork by Joe Dworetzky.  Follow him on Twitter @joedworetzky or Instagram at @joefaces.

Sunday, February 27, 2022

Democracy may turn out to be the winner in Putin's war.

Just a few weeks ago, it seemed inconceivable that Russia would invade Ukraine. This is the 21st century after all, and invading another sovereign country seems like such an antiquated approach to conflict resolution. And after all, what was the conflict that needed resolution? Ukraine presents no threat to Russia. At least no military threat. It isn’t like Chechnya, which harbored terrorists who slipped into Russia to plant bombs in its cities, nor did it pose some other kind of destabilizing threat to Russia that might warrant some kind of disproportionate military response. Ukraine gave up its Soviet-era nuclear warheads long ago, and Ukraine’s senior military brass have been straightforward in their assessment that if Putin chose to attack Ukraine, there was little Ukraine could do about it. 

Yet that is the path Putin chose, and no one should be surprised by the scope of his ambition. For the better part of two decades, Putin has insisted on three things. First, that Ukraine is historically part of Russia. Second, that the establishment of Ukraine as an independent country is part of a long-term strategy by the West to undermine the Russian state. And third, that Russia has the right to assert control over its “near-abroad.”


The persistent 
theme in the media – that Putin is a madman making up a self-serving narrative out of whole cloth – ignores the long history that brought the world to this point. Part of the inclination to portray Putin as unhinged is because he repeatedly frames Russia as the victim of Ukrainian aggression, while the world has watched as Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 seizing its territory, and over the past months encircled its less-powerful neighbor with battalions of tanks, girded for war. The core Russian demand over the years – that Ukraine forever forsake its ambitions to join NATO – stands in stark relief against persistent Russian actions that explained exactly why Ukrainians have felt the need to be part of an alliance that might come to its aid. 

It is difficult for many of us to take seriously historical narratives that differ from those we grew up with. The renderings of history that we learn early on in school ground our beliefs about right and wrong, about who is a hero and who is a scoundrel. We come to believe these truths to be self-evident, and resist the notion that others might view the world differently. This is vividly illustrated by the struggle many white people continue to have with the notion that Black Americans might have different narratives of our nation’s history than the ones that populate conventional textbooks. In a similar vein, we struggle to understand how Russians might view the West as the aggressor – which we have come to view as Russian paranoia – since Russia has so often been the aggressor in conflicts over the years. Understanding Putin’s perspective does not mean that he is right – or that his actions are excusable – but it can help us to better calibrate our own responses.


If one considers the Russian perspective – just for a moment – paranoia on their part may be warranted. Over the past 600 years, Russia has been invaded time and again by its neighbors. Turkey, Poland, Japan, Sweden and Germany have each invaded Russia at least twice. France only invaded once, but unlike the others, Napoleon Bonapart made it all the way to the gates of Moscow in one of the most chronicled military campaigns in history. If Ukraine itself never took a shot at Russia, it is probably because for all but a few decades of Russia’s thousand-plus years of existence, Ukraine was part of Russia. Indeed, it was the heartland of Russia, as the state we now know as Russia was originally founded during the 10th century with Kyiv as its capital. 


It is a sordid, conflict-ridden history, and one that drove Stalin’s determination to surround the Soviet Union with client states. It is this history that informs Putin’s oft-quoted comment that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest political tragedy of the 20th century. Although  the Soviet Union was our ideological foe, Putin’s pining for the Soviet era has been about borders rather than ideology. The Soviet Union built its phalanx of client states in Eastern Europe and along its southern flank – regions that Putin now refers to as Russia’s “near-abroad” – to provide a buffer zone, to protect the homeland from the next invading foreign armies that were sure to come. The siege of Leningrad and the Battle of Stalingrad, where an estimated two million civilians and soldiers died just 80 years ago, remain seared in the Russian psyche. 


Against that backdrop, the US policy of containment over the better part of the past century played into Russian historical fear of encirclement, further animating Russian paranoia. While keeping the Soviet Union in check was the premise behind the creation of NATO, Russian nationalists, who watched NATO continue to expand after the USSR was relegated to the ash heap of history, have long viewed NATO as just one more instrument of western power ultimately designed for the destruction of the Russian state.


As if to confirm those fears, in 1997, while western powers were debating whether to admit former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO, US foreign policy senior statesman Zbigniew Brzezinski published an article arguing that the ultimate US policy objective must be to break Russia up into three smaller states. A year later, after the US Senate ratified NATO expansion, George Kennan – the architect of the US policy of containment to combat the USSR decades earlier – predicted that the push to expand NATO toward the Russian border would ultimately provoke the Russian response we saw this week. 


Yet each step along the way – despite one warning after another – we have preferred to label Putin a madman rather than seriously consider the possibility that Russian fears of the West might be as historically grounded as the West’s fears of Russia. With a new American missile system recently installed in the Polish woods just 100 miles from the Russian border and 800 miles from Moscow and set to be operational later this year, it is remarkable that American pundits continue to be befuddled by Putin’s motives, seemingly forgetting how the United States and Russia marched to the brink of nuclear war sixty years ago at the height of the Cold War, when Russia planted its missiles 90 miles off the coast of Florida. Putin emphasized the point this past December, to any who might have been listening: “Are we deploying missiles near the US border? No, we are not. It is the United States that has come to our home with its missiles and is already standing at our doorstep.” 


The conventional wisdom is that Putin’s goal is to rewrite the post-World War II borders and rebuild the territorial footprint of the Soviet Union, yet over the years he has consistently framed his ambitions as dating farther back in time. Rather than the post-World War II world, he has envisioned a return to the Great Powers world that existed prior to World War I, when regional powers had the latitude to control political affairs within their own domain, unfettered by international law or the dictates of a global superpower. On February 4th, with little fanfare in the American media, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jingping – who has long shared Putin’s resentment at living under the heavy hand of US dictates – announced the return to just such an era, as together they affirmed Russia’s freedom of action over Ukraine, and China’s similar rights with respect to Taiwan.  


But things turned out not to be as simple as they seemed just a month ago. As Thomas Friedman wrote the other day, this week we saw “a raw, 18th-century-style land grab by a superpower –– but in a 21st-century globalized world. This is the first war that will be covered on TikTok by super-empowered individuals armed only with smartphones, so acts of brutality will be documented and broadcast worldwide without any editors or filters.” And so it has been. We watched this week as elementary school kids climbed out of a basement in eastern Ukraine, after their school was shelled by Russian troops. We heard about the Russian soldiers who laid down their arms, saying they thought they were there to gather intelligence, but had no interest in shooting people. We watched a national leader become a global hero, as the Ukrainian President stood his ground, urged his fellow citizens to stand up against Russian aggression, and refused US offers to fly him out of the country. And we watched as an overwhelmingly powerful military found out that things were not going to be as easy as they had thought. All in real time.


This week, just a day after China endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China declined to vote with Russia in the UN Security Council against a resolution deploring Putin’s action. Xi Jingping, who just four weeks ago announced a new world order, seemed to have had his own calculus regarding any military move against Taiwan abruptly upended. Putin did Xi the favor of testing the waters this week, and it turns out the water is very, very cold. Just a few days ago it appeared that the rising group of authoritarians across the globe might help Putin not just win the day, but win the future. Now, he is facing global condemnation, and Xi Jingping has abruptly turned his back. 


Just days ago Vladimir Putin was demanding Ukraine’s unilateral disarmament and surrender as the price of starting peace talks. Now, peace talks have begun with no preconditions. Perhaps what we thought just a few weeks ago might actually be true; that this is the 21st century, and there are things that you just can’t do anymore.


Follow David Paul on Twitter @dpaul. He is working on a book, with a working title of "FedExit! To Save Our Democracy, It’s Time to Let Alabama Be Alabama and Set California Free."

Artwork by Joe Dworetzky.  Follow him on Twitter @joedworetzky or Instagram at @joefaces.

Friday, January 28, 2022

Will it take Joe Manchin switching parties for Democrats to realize he is not their enemy?

If Democrats have a strategy, it has not been easy to discern. It has been a year since the  run-off elections in Georgia left the country with a 50-50 split in the Senate. As the 2020 election approached, the possibility that Democrats had a chance not just to flip the Senate from the then-53 seat GOP majority, but win their own 55-seat majority danced like sugar-plums in their heads. The plans for the Democrat control of Congress and the White House dazzled the faithful. Reshaping the Supreme Court to redress the perfidy of the Merrick Garland nomination – four years before Amy Coney Barrett’s last minute elevation to the Court – led the agenda. And there was Medicare expansion, immigration reform, free college tuition, myriad climate change initiatives, and on and on.


It did not come to be, of course. Despite running against a president viewed by Gallup as the most polarizing on record, Democrats barely limped away with control in the House. And it took two run-off victories in Georgia to win a 50-50 split in the Senate. A 50-50 Senate, with the reliance on Kamala Harris as the tie-breaking vote is a world apart from a 55-45 majority, as polling guru Nate Silver pointed out on the eve of the election. While fivethirtyeight.com gave Democrats a 75% chance of flipping the Senate that night, Silver observed that something less than that would leave moderates – he pointed to Joe Manchin – in control of the agenda. 


Insanity, Albert Einstein is credited with having observed, is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. So it has been over the past year, and so it was again last week. Everyone, whatever their point of view on the matter, understood as the Senate debated voting rights legislation that it had no chance of passage; and yet the White House and Democrats in the Senate pushed ahead. Why exactly seems unclear. Perhaps party leaders felt a duty of loyalty to base voters to bring the matter to a vote. Perhaps some believed there might be a moral victory, or perhaps some future political advantage to be gained in forcing Republicans to vote no. Perhaps. But after a year of watching one legislative initiative after another fall by the wayside, the vote seemed less one of a party standing on principle than one more demonstration of strategic miscalculation.


Democrats of all stripes are steaming with rage in the wake of the unwillingness of two of their colleagues to agree to change the Senate filibuster rules and allow voting rights legislation to become law. Yet as painful as it is to admit, the intransigence of Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema on the filibuster and other Democrat plans is the symptom, not the cause, of the larger problem, which is, as Nate Silver observed, the limitations of what is possible in a 50-50 Senate. From the day the Georgia results were announced, one thing was clear: Joe Manchin was the de facto majority leader of the Senate. Chuck Schumer may have that label on the door to his office in the Hart Senate Office Building, but his is a title in name only. Unlike Mitch McConnell, who holds an iron fist over his now-minority caucus, Schumer can only pass legislation with the consent of Joe Manchin. 


It is unclear how this basic fact of vote counting seems to have eluded so many Democrats for so long. Early on, progressives, in particular, seemed to cling to an illusion that the world was other than it is. During the run-up to the 2020 election, Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez made the accurate observation that in most other countries, she and Joe Biden would be in different political parties. In many parliamentary democracies, a small energized political faction might indeed be able to win significant commitments and concessions as the price of joining a governing coalition. But ours is not a parliamentary system, and despite their considerable efforts to impose their will on the Democratic Party, progressive Democrats have proven time and time again over the last year that they do not have the leverage that Joe Manchin has. There is no reason to yell and scream about it; that is just the way it is. 


The irony of progressive rage at Joe Biden’s failure to deliver on their agenda is that he was not given a mandate for progressive transformation by the electorate. If transformation of the nation was on the minds of voters in 2020, there were many candidates to choose from during the Democratic primaries. Indeed, Fox News exit polls from the 2020 November election suggest that the country is much more centrist than one might assume from the tenor of our unceasing partisan warfare, with 12% of voters describing themselves as very liberal and 16% as very conservative, while the remaining 72% lie somewhere in between. Among Democratic primary voters – who by a substantial majority described themselves as moderate or conservative – and general election voters of all political leanings exhausted by four years of Donald Trump, voting for Joe Biden was as much as anything a vote for a few years of peace and quiet. As one Democratic strategist observed at the time, people were tired of having Hulk Hogan in the White House and were ready for a few years of Mister Rogers.


It was not to be. After seeing their hopes for a strong Senate majority dashed by a cautious electorate, Democrats might have taken the long view and worked to rebuild the trust of the electorate, even as the GOP was being drawn inexorably into the grip of conspiracy theorists and fringe agitators. But instead of seizing the opportunity to build a broad coalition of those praying to return the country to some kind of normalcy, Congressional Democrats have spent a year fighting for an agenda of “transformation” with a desperation that reeks of a belief that this 50-50 Senate is the best and only opportunity they are ever going to have. It did not have to be that way. 


It was just a few years ago, after all, that Democrats held a 59-41 seat majority in the Senate, a majority that was made possible by an explicit strategy of seeking candidates that were suited to the profile of the electorate in each state and congressional district. Manchin is immune to pressure from Democratic activists – indeed bullying by the left only inures to his benefit back home – for the simple reason that he knows his constituents: he out-performed Joe Biden in West Virginia by nearly 20 points, beating his last Republican opponent 50% to 46%, while Donald Trump trounced Joe Biden 69% to 30%. 


“The bottom line,” Massachusetts Senator Edward Markey commented last week after the defeat of the voting rights legislation, “is that…the only thing that can pass is a package that has the votes.” While Markey’s conclusion would have been more useful had he made it a year ago, after the Georgia election, rather than last week, it suggests that after a year of banging their heads against the wall, Democrats may be ready to step back and consider what is possible in a 50-50 Senate. 


Perhaps, but perhaps not. The response among many progressives to a year of failed efforts has not been to look in the mirror and consider whether they might be out of step with an electorate that is more centrist than they might imagine. Instead, they have suggested that if there is learning to be done, the onus is not on them. Bernie Sanders set the tone, as he pronounced that this is a moment to double down on the progressive agenda, rather than pull back, showing more enthusiasm for talking about mounting primary challenges against Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema Sinema – neither of whom are up for election until 2024, when the stakes for Democrats loom to be far greater than those two Senate seats – than supporting any pared back legislation that Joe Biden may offer. 


The 2022 midterm elections are just nine months away, and Democrats are already confronting significant headwinds. Historical data suggests that the party that holds the White House loses an average of 26 seats in the House and enough in the Senate to put Mitch McConnell back in charge. And this time, Democrats won’t have Donald Trump to kick around – or at least he will not be on the ballot. Against that backdrop, Democrats cannot afford continued infighting if they want to hold on to majorities in Congress; yet it appears to be unavoidable. Progressives and moderates have been at each other’s throats since the results began to trickle in on election night 2020, as each side blamed the other for the party’s disappointing performance. Perhaps if Joe Manchin accepted Mitch McConnell’s urging for him to switch parties – putting all of their ambitions at risk, to say nothing of a Supreme Court seat – Democrats would wake up and realize how much is at stake. 


ORIGINALLY POSTED TO GRAFFITI BY DAVID PAUL ON SUNDAY, JANUARY 27, 2022.

Follow David Paul on Twitter @dpaul. He is working on a book, with a working title of "FedExit! To Save Our Democracy, It’s Time to Let Alabama Be Alabama and Set California Free."

Artwork by Joe Dworetzky.  Follow him on Twitter @joedworetzky or Instagram at @joefaces.